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BROADCAST LICENSEES: FAIR GAME FOR
CORPORATE RAIDERS*
M. Michele Faber**
The conventional wisdom in the regulation of broadcasting has been that a
transfer of control cannot lawfully occur without prior Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC) approval. To the party seeking control, this re-
quirement has meant the filing of detailed applications and the potential for
lengthy delays or public hearings. This approach worked reasonably well in
the context of voluntary acquisitions and in a less volatile market. The
Commission's conventional transfer of control procedures appear less appro-
priate, however, in today's competitive business environment.
With the recent trend of hostile takeovers, the FCC has reason to examine
its traditional approach to transfer of control applications. Experience has
shown that the acquiror in a contested acquisition faces an untenable regula-
tory dilemma. The acquiror may submit to protracted FCC review proceed-
ings and thereby risk defeat by incumbent licensee management.
Alternatively, the acquiror may effect transfer of control consistent with fed-
eral securities and antitrust laws but in possible violation of FCC require-
ments. This situation lends itself to administrative inefficiency as well as to
potential costly and time-consuming litigation. It also places the Commis-
sion in the position of inadvertently favoring the target station's
management.
FCC Chairman Mark S. Fowler summarized the dilemma as follows: "A
hostile takeover situation has never been faced by the agency before ...
What procedures would the Commission employ that would be permissible,
and indeed legal, under the Communications Act and Section [310(d)]? We
* Subsequent to this writing but contemporaneous with its publication, the FCC has
released its formal Policy Statement regarding tender offers and proxy contests for control of
publicly held licensee broadcast stations. The Commission's Policy Statement concurs largely
with the author's viewpoint and differs only in the extent to which it specifies alternative
procedures for proxy contests distinct from those for tender offer situations. In re Tender
Offers and Proxy Contests, Policy Statement, MM Docket No. 85-218, FCC 86-67 (released
Mar. 17, 1986).
** Attorney in the Legal Division of the Federal Reserve Board. Formerly an associate
with the Washington, D.C. communications law firm of Gurman, Kurtis & Blask, Chartered.
B.S., Northwestern University; M.A., Northwestern University; J.D. American University.
Washington College of Law.
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have not answered that question yet. It would be a case of first
impression."'
Since then, on an ad hoc basis, the Commission has approved a short form
application procedure permitting a hostile proxy contest to go forward rap-
idly, without complying with the public notice and petition-to-deny proce-
dures specified in the Communications Act.2 The Commission has also
granted special temporary authority and condoned a voting trust arrange-
ment in recent cases involving hostile tender offers.3 Although the Commis-
sion's policy of dealing with hostile takeovers is gradually evolving, it is far
from clear. At this writing, the FCC has released a Notice of Inquiry4 pro-
posing to better delineate its regulatory role in the context of current market
forces.
It is the purpose of this article to show that FCC regulatory objectives
may be achieved without prejudice to the normal forces of competition. Part
I introduces the nature of the controversy and reviews the FCC's traditional
approach to changes in control of licensee broadcast stations. Part II dis-
cusses the neutral stance taken by other regulatory agencies in contested
takeover struggles. The federal securities and antitrust requirements appli-
cable to a hostile takeover of a publicly traded company and the defensive
measures that a target company may employ are considered in Part III.
Part IV delineates the FCC's statutory and regulatory justifications for
adopting a more flexible approach for reviewing changes in control of pub-
licly held licensees. Finally, alternative theories for effecting a lawful trans-
fer of control without contravening the Communications Act or FCC policy
are set forth in Part V.
I. NATURE OF THE CONTROVERSY ADDRESSED
A. Transferring Control of a Broadcast Station
The transfer of control of a licensee broadcast station is governed by sec-
tion 310(d) of the Communications Act.5 In essence, section 310(d) pro-
1. Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations (Subcomm. on
the Dep'ts of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies), 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. pt. 2, at 731 (1985) (statement of Mark S. Fowler, Chairman, FCC) [hereinafter cited
as Appropriations Committee Hearings].
2. See, e.g., Committee for Full Value of Storer Communications, Inc., 100 F.C.C.2d
434, afl'd, Storer Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 763 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
3. In re One-Two Corp., 58 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 924 (1985); In re L.P. Media, Inc.,
58 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1527 (1985).
4. In re Tender Offers and Proxy Contests, Notice of Inquiry, [current service] RAD.
REG. 2d (P&F) 53:35 (1985).
5. 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (1982). As originally enacted, subsection (d) was designated as
subsection (b). See Pub. L. No. 93-505, 88 Stat. 1516 (1974). In the interest of clarity, in the
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vides that no license nor control over any license may be transferred "unless
the Commission shall, after securing full information decide that said trans-
fer is in the public interest."' 6 Based upon a narrow reading of the statute,
then, acquisition of a licensee broadcast station cannot lawfully transpire
without prior approval from the FCC.
The legislative history of the Communications Act indicates that Congress
intended "control" to be broadly construed.7 In fact, drafters of the Act
specifically refrained from any attempt to define control fearing that this
would unduly limit the meaning of the term. Congressional committee re-
ports suggest only that wherever the statute refers to control, Congress' in-
tent was to include actual control as well as legally enforceable control.'
The Communications Act does not include a definition of control. The
FCC's definition of control is therefore critical to a potential acquiror of a
licensee broadcast station. Decisions before the FCC indicate that there are
numerous ways to depict control. For purposes of section 310(d), control is
not limited to majority stock ownership. In fact, statutory control may be
evinced by purchasing a small percentage of voting shares if that acquisition
is sufficient to exert actual working control over the licensee.9 Moreover,
control may be inferred from the power to influence day-to-day operations, 0
to dominate the licensee's financial affairs or to determine management
prerogatives. "
The Commission recognized certain deficiencies in its transfer of control
procedures as early as 1948.12 In the AVCO case, the FCC noted that "im-
mediate steps should be taken to bring the procedure in transfer cases into
harmony with the theory of competition which underlies the Communica-
ensuing discussion, all references to former subsection (b) will be changed to denote current
subsection (d).
6. Id. The specific mandate of § 310(d) and its relationship to other statutory provisions
is discussed further infra text accompanying notes 18-29.
7. See H.R. REP. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1934); accord Rochester Telephone
Corp. v. United States, 23 F. Supp. 634 (W.D.N.Y. 1938).
8. See H.R. REP. No. 221, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
9. Accord WWIZ, Inc. v. FCC, 36 F.C.C. 561 (1964), enf'd sub non. Lorain Journal v.
FCC, 351 F.2d 826 (D.D.C. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 967 (1966). Cf M & M Broadcasting
Co., 26 F.C.C. 35 (1959).
10. WHDH, Inc. v. FCC, 17 F.C.C.2d 856 (1969). The FCC held that "a realistic defini-
tion of the word 'control' includes any act which vests in a new entity or individual the right to
determine the manner or means of operating the license and determining the policy the licen-
see will pursue." Id. at 863.
11. In re Benjamin L. Dubb, 16 F.C.C. 274 (1951). In passing upon the transfer-of-con-
trol issue, the Commission stated "while we regard minority . . . interest as an important
element in our determination . . . we are governed chiefly by the demonstration of. . . power
to dominate the management of corporate affairs." Id. at 289.
12. In the Matter of Powel Crosley, Jr. (AVCO), 3 RAD. REG. (P & F) 6 (1948).
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tions Act." 3 Thereafter, the Commission proposed several new procedures
to govern future transfer of control cases. 4 The new regulations were not to
apply, however, where the proposed transfer entailed less than a controlling
interest in a licensee station. Similarly, the FCC declined to apply these
rules to cases where transfer of a license involved no substantial change in
control of the broadcast station.1 5
The Commission subsequently addressed the competing interests raised in
transfer of control procedures by issuing a formal notice. The Commission
recognized that "doubtful and borderline cases" may exist wherein it be-
comes unclear whether a proposed transaction effects a transfer of control
within the meaning of section 310(d). 6 Among these borderline cases, the
FCC specifically noted those which effectively insulate de facto from de jure
control. In a hostile takeover, for example, a proposed acquiror may employ
any of several devices to forestall transfer of de facto control.' 7 By means of
a voting trust, escrow arrangement, or other insulating device, control may
be shifted to another entity not a party to the acquisition.
Despite the potential for ambiguity, the FCC cautioned that any doubt or
uncertainty as to the legality of an acquisition should be resolved by inform-
ing the Commission in advance as to the details of a proposed transfer. The
FCC's notice further indicated that consummation of a transfer prior to
Commission consent or knowledge of the transaction will not be condoned
and may be grounds for disapproval of the transfer application.' 8 A careful
reading of the Commission's statement reveals some measure of flexibility in
the typical application process. The Commission places great significance on
prior approval or prior disclosure in transfer of control proceedings. The
notice therefore suggests that, in the absence of prior consent, an acquiror
could avoid disapproval of a proposed transfer by keeping the FCC fully
apprised of its acquisition plans.
Following the release of its formal order, the FCC encountered repeated
challenges to its prior approval requirement.' 9 In large measure, these chal-
13. Id. at 17. In the AVCO case, a retiring broadcaster attempted to choose his successor
licensee by selling his station to the highest bidder. The FCC's concern was that as a result of
Crosley's transfer to AVCO, the successor licensee had not been selected based on a competi-
tive application.
14. See infra note 33 and accompanying text. For a detailed discussion of the FCC's
current procedures, see infra text accompanying notes 21-41.
15. 3 RAD. REG. at 29.
16. Procedure on Transfer and Assignment of Licenses, Public Notice 20,805, 4 RAD.
REG. (P & F) 342, 343 (1948).
17. See generally M. LIprON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS § 1.04
(1986).
18. 4 RAD. REG. at 342.
19. Several of these challenges are discussed infra text accompanying notes 211-20.
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lenges stemmed from circumstances where a proposed transfer involved an
insubstantial change of control or where some insulating element of the
transaction prevented the acquiror from exercising a controlling influence.
To date, a great number of the section 310(d) cases before the Commission
have pertained to voluntary transfers of control. Other cases have involved
section 310(d) issues along with petitions for approval in the context of the
Commission's cross-ownership or multiple ownership rules.2° By contrast,
the FCC has heard very few cases involving hostile takeovers of a publicly
held licensee, and until recently, none has suggested alternative means for
securing FCC approval in that type of situation.
B. Requirement of Prior FCC Approval
1. Relevant Statutory Provisions
The FCC's approach to transfer of control applications is founded in part
upon the Commission's statutory directive.2" The Federal Communications
Act, section 310(d), provides that no license may be transferred "except
upon application to the Commission and upon finding by the Commission
that the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served thereby."22
The statute requires that an application of this nature be treated as if the
proposed transferee were applying under section 308(a) of the Act,23 which
covers applications for licenses in the first instance as well as modifications
or renewals of existing licenses. Section 309(b) delineates the element of tim-
ing in a grant of approval, by stating that "no such application . . . shall be
granted by the Commission earlier than thirty days following issuance of
public notice by the Commission of the acceptance for filing .. ,,24
The Act provides for several exceptions to the typical application proce-
dure in section 309(c).25 Among these are an assignment or transfer "which
does not involve a substantial change in ownership or control," or "any spe-
cial or temporary authorization to permit interim operation . . . to provide
substantially the same service as would be authorized by such license
20. The Commission's regulations relating to cross-ownership are found at 47 C.F.R.
§§ 73.636, 76.501 (1985). See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 68 F.C.C.2d 1302 (1978).
21. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-156 (1982).
22. 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (1982). As strictly construed, the prohibition applies to any "con-
struction permit or station license, or any rights thereunder." Moreover, it restricts the trans-
fer, assignment, or disposition thereof "in any manner, voluntarily or involuntarily, directly or
indirectly, or by transfer of control of any corporation holding such permit or license, to any
person. . .. " Id.
23. 47 U.S.C. § 308(a) (1982). Accord Citizens Comm. v. FCC, 436 F.2d 263, 268 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
24. 47 U.S.C. § 309(b) (1982).
25. Id. § 309(c).
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.... ,26 Pursuant to section 309(f), the Commission may "grant a tempo-
rary authorization, accompanied by a statement of its reasons therefor, to
permit such emergency operations for a period not exceeding 180 days."
27
Thus, the Commission may permit exception to section 309(b) timing
requirements if it finds that "the grant of a license application is otherwise
authorized by law and . .. that there are extraordinary circumstances re-
quiring temporary operations in the public interest ... "28
Section 309(e) preserves FCC review "in the case of any application
[which presents] . . . a substantial and material question of fact.", 29 In that
event, the FCC may "formally designate the application for hearing on the
grounds or reasons then obtaining . . . . Pursuant to section 309(d)(1),
"[a]ny party in interest may file with the Commission a petition to deny any
application . . . at any time prior to the day of Commission grant thereof
without hearing or the day of formal designation thereof for hearing
... ," Thus, section 309 provides for certain safeguards in the process of
approving contested applications. Within the specified time period, that pro-
vision retains for the FCC and any opposing party in interest the option to
dispute any material questions of fact. Pursuant to section 403, the Commis-
sion also has
full authority and power at any time to institute an inquiry, on its
own motion, in any case and as to any matter or thing concerning
which complaint is authorized to be made, to or before the Com-
mission by any provision of this chapter, or concerning which any
question may arise under any of the provisions of this chapter, or
relating to the enforcement of this chapter.32
The Commission may therefore undertake inquiry on its own motion at any
26. Id. §§ 309(c)(2)(B)-(C) (emphasis added).
27. Id. § 209(f). The Commission also has discretion to extend such temporary authoriza-
tion for one additional period not to exceed 180 days.
28. Id.
29. Id. § 309(e). The provision also applies to any application for which the Commission
is unable to ascertain that the public interest, convenience, or necessity will be served by a
grant thereof.
30. Id.
31. Id. § 309(d)(1) (requiring that the Commission determine that the public interest, con-
venience, or necessity will be served). This section further provides that "[tihe petition shall
contain specific allegations of fact sufficient to show that the petitioner is a party in interest and
that a grant of the application would be prima facie inconsistent with subsection (a) .
Id.
32. 47 U.S.C. § 403 (1982). This section further provides that "[tihe Commission shall
have the same powers and authority to proceed with any inquiry instituted on its own motion




point in the approval process, even in the case where expedited approval or
temporary authorization has been granted.
2. Application Procedures
The Commission's Application Form 31533 for consent to transfer of con-
trol poses specific obstacles for the acquiror in a hostile takeover situation.
For example, the guidelines for section I require that the applicant submit
the contract or agreement between the transferor and transferee.
The directions to section VI list various certification requirements to
which the transferor, licensee, and transferee must each attest.34 The gen-
eral instructions to the application also incorporate the public notice provi-
sion of the Commission's rules, including the requirement that publication
be completed within thirty days of submitting the application. 35 These fac-
tors suggest that the application form itself does not account for transfer of
control in a hostile takeover context. The possibility of any cooperative un-
dertaking between the transferor and the transferee is minimal at best.
Alternatively, the FCC may permit an applicant to submit a more abbre-
viated Form 316.36 For instance, that form of filing may be appropriate in
proxy contests generally or in tender offer situations where the proposed
transfer of a licensee station does not entail a substantial exercise of control-
ling influence. 37 The short-form application requires fewer details as to the
circumstances surrounding a proposed transaction. It also dispenses with
the necessity for cooperative filing by the acquiror and target licensee. More
importantly, in the event of a hostile takeover bid, an abbreviated Form 316
facilitates more expeditious review by the FCC.38
Form 316 still provides the FCC with sufficient information to assure that
a proposed transaction comports with the strictures of section 310(d). For
example, item 9 directs the applicant to submit a narrative statement as to
33. FCC Form 315, Application for Consent to Transfer of Control of Corporation Hold-
ing Radio Broadcast Station Construction Permit or License (expires Mar. 31, 1986), reprinted
in [Finding Aids, Master Index, Forms] RAD. REG. (P & F) 98:315 (1985).
34. Id. at 98:315-2, 315-5, §§ I & VI.
35. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3564(c) (1985). Specifically, the applicant for consent to transfer con-
trol of a broadcast station license must give local notice in a newspaper of general circulation
in the community in which the station is located. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3580(c) (1985). Local notice
is also required to be broadcast over the station itself. Id.
36. FCC Form 316, Application for Consent to Transfer of Control of Corporation Hold-
ing Radio Broadcast Station Construction Permit or License (Short Form) (expires Apr. 30,
1986), reprinted in [Finding Aids, Master Index, Forms] RAD. REG. (P & F) 98:316-1 to -2
(1985).
37. The FCC specifically authorized the filing of Form 316 in a proxy contest for control
of Storer Communications. Id. at 98:316-1.
38. Id.
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the reasons for undertaking a transfer of control. Item 15 requires that the
applicant state its interest in terms of the shares of licensee stock held and
the percentage equivalent thereof. The consideration given for shares is ac-
counted for in item 11. If the consideration is monetary, the applicant must
specify the source of funds, the entity to which they are paid, and the terms
of payment. Additionally, if circumstances warrant, the general instructions
to Form 316 preserve for the Commission an option to require the refiling of
more detailed information. 9
The FCC has yet another option for reviewing a hostile bid for control of
a broadcast licensee. When circumstances of the takeover justify a neutral
regulatory posture, the Commission may grant an applicant special or tem-
porary authorization to proceed with its acquisition plans. Pursuant to Code
of Federal Regulations section 73.3542, o an application for temporary au-
thorization should be filed at least ten days before the proposed transaction
date. The authorization period may not exceed 180 days and the Commis-
sion may cancel the temporary grant at any earlier time without further no-
tice or right to a hearing.4 '
C. Problems With Hostile Takeovers
The FCC has espoused varying interpretations of its directive under sec-
tion 310(d). Previously, the Commission varied its approach according to
the novelty and complexity of a given transfer proposal. More recently, the
Commission has responded to certain tensions between regulatory enforce-
ment and competition. In the context of hostile takeovers, there are broad
administrative and public policy reasons for the Commission to adopt a
more uniform approach to the issues raised. The need for regulatory change
is particularly compelling in the context of present-day transfer proposals
involving fiercely contested bids for publicly held licensees.
4 2
1. Market Forces and Competition
a. The Storer case
Debate over the FCC's proper role in regulating hostile takeovers of pub-
licly traded licensees intensified recently following news of a proxy contest
for control of Storer Communications, Inc.43 Controversy as to the FCC's
39. Id.
40. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3542 (1985); 47 C.F.R. § 73.3540(b) (1985).
41. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3540(b) (1985).
42. See generally E. KRANSOW & L. LONGLEY, THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULA-
TION (1978).
43. FCC to Review Storer Decision, Wash. Post, Apr. 6, 1985, at D9, col. 4. Storer Com-
munications, Inc., is a Miami-based broadcasting and cable television company.
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involvement focused on the question of whether broadcast licensees should
receive radically different treatment than other regulated companies that be-
come targets of hostile takeover bids. The proxy fight for control of Storer
ensued when, on March 19, 1985, an investor group owning five percent of
the company's stock indicated that it wanted to solicit enough votes to elect
its own slate of directors. Thereafter, the investor group planned to liquidate
Storer. The licensee's shareholders would allegedly benefit from the transac-
tion in that the broadcaster's assets far exceeded its stock market price.
Initially, the FCC declined to intervene in the proxy contest because it did
not infer transfer of control from a change in the membership of Storer's
board of directors." Subsequently, the Commission found that the proposed
change in Storer's board of directors would constitute a transfer of control
within the meaning of section 310(d).4" The FCC regarded the transfer as
lawful, however, because the proposed change of control would not be sub-
stantial.4 6 In essence, the FCC believed ultimate voting control remained
with the company's stockholders, most of whom would not change. The
Commission also relied on its statutory discretion to fashion appropriate
procedures for review under section 310(d).47 For these reasons, the FCC
allowed the investor group seeking to solicit proxies to file a modified Form
316 application providing for review on an expedited basis.4"
b. Warner Communications
Yet another example of the problems posed by hostile takeovers was
presented by the 1984 takeover struggle for control of Warner Communica-
tions, Inc. (Warner).49 Warner was the target of a hostile acquisition by
Keith Rupert Murdoch, principal owner of the News Corporation and News
International (collectively referred to as the Murdoch Group). In order to
thwart the Murdoch Group's takeover attempt, Warner arranged for a
friendly exchange of stock with Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. and its wholly
owned subsidiary, BHC, Inc. Under the agreement, Warner received shares
44. Id. at D10, col. 4. In response to petitions from Storer and other broadcasters, the
FCC agreed to formally consider its position and to issue a written release. See infra note 45
and accompanying text.
45. FCC Rel. No. MM-16 (Apr. 11, 1985).
46. The Commission based its conclusion on the language of 47 U.S.C. § 309(c)(2)(B)
(1982). The proposed change of directors involved no change in ownership and no transfer of
voting shares.
47. Short Form, supra note 36. The application would be modified to include a list of the
proposed directors as well as information about their citizenship and media ownership.
48. 47 U.S.C. § 309(g) (1982). The Commission's statutory standards for review of trans-
fer of control applications are discussed further supra at text accompanying notes 18-38.
49. In re News Int'l, PLC, 97 F.C.C.2d 349 (1984). Warner Communications, Inc. v.
Murdoch, 581 F. Supp. 1482 (D. Del. 1984).
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of BHC preferred stock representing a twenty percent voting interest.
Warner was also given the option of converting its preferred shares into
42.5% of BHC's common stock, leaving Chris-Craft with a 57.5% interest. 50
In exchange, BHC received the same number of convertible preferred shares,
representing a 15.6% voting interest in Warner. Other features of the agree-
ment included provisions to avoid dilution of either BHC's or Warner's vot-
ing interest. 5
The issue of unlawful transfer of control between Warner and Chris-Craft
arose in the context of an alleged violation of the Communications Act's
prohibitions against cross-ownership.52 Based on the record before it, the
FCC found that the agreement between Warner and Chris-Craft did not
contravene section 320(d) because there was no evidence that Warner would
actually exercise control over the personnel practices, finances, or program-
ming of BHC's stations.53 According to the Commission, the transfer of
shares did not grant Warner "the right to determine the manner or means of
operating [BHC nor] . . . the policy that the licensee would pursue."54
Moreover, there was no indication that Warner would "dominate the man-
agement of [BHC's] corporate affairs." 55
Warner and Chris-Craft entered into the exchange agreement in an effort
to defeat a hostile takeover of Warner by the Murdoch Group. In this re-
spect, the transfer of stock ownership was used to obstruct a contested acqui-
sition rather than to facilitate it. Nonetheless, the FCC's analysis of the
transfer of control question highlights some of the factors for consideration
in a competitive market context. The Commission distinguished between
the passage of influence and the transfer of substantial control. Given the
complexity of modern business transactions, the FCC acknowledged that
there was no precise formula for determining when a transfer falls within the
50. Warner Communications, Inc., 581 F. Supp. at 1486. Thus, the agreement raised an
issue as to exercise of actual (de facto) control rather than legal (de jure) control.
51. Warner and BHC retained the right of first refusal with regard to the shares each
owned in the other. In order to ensure that Warner would have a minority representation on
BHC's board of directors, BHC's charter and bylaws were amended to permit cumulative
voting. The agreement also insured Warner's acquiescence in any corporate maneuvers of
BHC by requiring at least two-thirds shareholder approval. This restriction extended to any
plans by BHC to further amend its charter or bylaws, to engage in any merger or liquidation or
to sell substantially all of its assets.
52. In re News Int'l, PLC, 97 F.C.C.2d 349 (1984). At the time, News International,
along with its parent, The News Corporation, Ltd., controlled two daily newspapers. Chris-
Craft, through its subsidiary, BHC, controlled the licenses of one UHF and five VHF televi-
sion stations. Warner and American Express Company each owned 50% of Warner-Amex
Cable Communications, Inc. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 3 10(a) (1982).
53. 97 F.C.C.2d at 358. See Stereo Broadcasters, Inc., 87 F.C.C.2d 87, 93 (1981).
54. WHDH, Inc., 17 F.C.C.2d 856, 863 (1969).
55. Benjamin L. Dubb, 16 F.C.C. 274, 289 (1951).
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meaning of section 310(d). Basically, the Commission reasoned that the
controlling influence passed must be sufficient to allow a minority share-
holder either to determine the licensee's policies and operations or to domi-
nate the licensee's corporate affairs.
56
The FCC also considered allegations that the merger agreement permitted
Warner to exercise negative control over BHC. Negative control allegedly
resulted from the specific restrictions imposed on BHC in order to avoid any
dilution of voting interests in the shares of stock exchanged. The Commis-
sion decided that these restrictions were designed to protect a minority
shareholder's investment; as such, they did not automatically constitute a
transfer of control.57
Finally, the Commission recognized the prospective nature of the ex-
change agreement between Warner and Chris-Craft. In the absence of evi-
dence to the contrary, the FCC reasoned that it was appropriate to infer that
the parties would honor the representations made in their agreement. The
terms of the exchange indicated that despite Warner's substantial minority
interest in BHC, Chris-Craft would retain majority voting power to elect the
Board of Directors. Chris-Craft specifically stated its intention to exercise
that controlling influence and Warner denied any plans to exercise it. The
Commission therefore decided that the transfer of a minority interest to
Warner did not violate section 310(d). 8
2. Conflicting Regulatory Requirements
In order to effectively compete in business, a licensee broadcast station
may raise capital or finance its operations by issuing shares of stock. If the
licensee's shares are publicly held, transfer of control in its stock ownership
may subject the broadcaster to review by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC). 9 The conflicting demands of these agencies on a
broadcast licensee may prove untenable in the case of a hostile takeover
bid.6° In that situation, the acquiror is constrained by multiple disclosure
56. 97 F.C.C.2d at 356.
57. Id. at 354. See Cleveland Television Corp., 91 F.C.C.2d 1129, 1132-33 (Rev. Bd.
1982), afl'd, 732 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also L.B. Wilson, Inc. v. FCC, 397 F.2d 717
(D.C. Cir. 1968) (holding that a minority right to block the sale of substantial assets did not
necessarily imply an exercise of de facto control).
58. 97 F.C.C.2d at 356. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 7 RAD. REG. (P & F) 298
(1951).
59. Specifically, the acquiror is bound by Williams Act filing requirements and by Hart-
Scott-Rodino Act disclosures. See infra discussion at text accompanying notes 185-207.
60. A takeover is an attempt by a bidder to acquire control of a target company through
purchase of some or all of its outstanding shares.
1986]
Catholic University Law Review
requirements and particularly critical timing limitations. Moreover, there is
always a threat of third-party intervenors and a barrage of takeover de-
fenses.6 ' Given the further requirements of prior FCC approval to under-
take a transfer of control, the acquiror may be so constrained by conflicting
regulatory demands that normal market forces have no chance to operate.
As the foregoing examples indicate, an acquiror's efforts to comply with
FCC rules may be thwarted by circumstances beyond its control. The regu-
latory process should provide sufficient flexibility to account for contested
applications. Alternatively, the Commission should grant expedited review
of the information submitted to it until the requirements of the application
process can be fully complied with. Otherwise, the applicant may be con-
strained to violate section 310(d) simply by virtue of the target's uncoopera-
tive posture. The result may be that, by default, the Commission winds up
favoring the dissenting licensee.
In recent testimony before a congressional committee, Chairman Fowler
described the potential for bias in enforcing the FCC's regulations:
[I]t is a complicated area, and the problem relates to acquiring
stock in a publicly held company. If you make a tender offer, there
is a point you will reach, perhaps quickly, depending on your offer,
where you in effect have acquired sufficient stock to have effected a
de facto transfer of control; that is, transfer of de facto control of
the company.
Not legal control, that is, not more than fifty percent. With a
publicly held company it would be thirteen percent, for example,
which is sufficient to gain de facto control of the company. If there
is not a mechanism in place which permits the stock to be gathered
by someone and held legally when they hit that benchmark, then
they have run afoul of [section 310(d)] of the Act.62
II. NEUTRAL STANCE OF OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
The transfer of control pursuant to hostile tender offer also occurs in other
regulated businesses. The neutral stance taken by other administrative agen-
cies underscores the competing interests of business and federal regulation.
The viewpoint of other regulators is also instructive in that it entails a pre-
sumption that, below a specified percentage, transfer of control is not inher-
ently unlawful. By contrast, the FCC has adopted the view that control is
unlawful unless proven otherwise or unless countervailing circumstances ex-
ist. In deference to the marketplace and the normal forces of competition,
61. See generally M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 17, at chs. 3, 6.
62. Appropriations Committee Hearings, supra note 1, at 731-32 (statement of Chairman
Fowler); see also Senate Commerce Committee Hearings, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1985).
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the Commission should adopt an approach to the transfer of control prob-
lem that is consonant with that of other federal regulators.
A. Civil Aeronautics Board
Section 408(a)(5) of the Federal Aviation Act provides, in relevant part,
that:
it shall be unlawful [unless approved by order of the Civil Aero-
nautics Board] . . . for any air carrier or person controlling an air
carrier, any other common carrier, or any person substantially en-
gaged in the business of aeronautics to acquire control of any air
carrier in any manner whatsoever .... 63
Control, as defined in section 408(f), arises upon the purchase or beneficial
ownership of ten percent or more of voting securities.' That control is con-
sidered lawful up to twenty-five percent stock ownership. Above the thresh-
old, there exists a presumption of unlawfulness which may be rebutted by
the acquiror.65 Section 408(b) states that the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB) may by order exempt certain acquisitions to the extent and for such
periods as may be in the public interest. 66 Subsection (b) further provides
that any party challenging a proposed transfer of control bears the burden of
proving the transaction is unlawful. Thus, under section 408(b), an other-
wise permissible transfer of control is presumed lawful unless evidence is
presented to the contrary. The CAB may also find public policy reasons for
exempting a particular transfer proposal from the approval requirement.
1. Trusts with Proportionate Voting of Shares
In several recent cases, the CAB has recognized that a strict requirement
of prior regulatory approval could effectively impede a legitimate hostile
takeover attempt. 67 In 1978, the CAB allowed Texas International Airlines
(TXI) and Pan American World Airways (Pan Am) to each acquire up to
63. Section 408(a)(5) of the Federal Aviation Act, Pub. L. No. 91-62, 83 Stat. 103 (1969)
(amendment codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1378(a)(5) (1982)).
64. Id. § 408(f), 83 Stat. 104 (amendment codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1378(0 (1982)). Thus,
control arises with "ownership of such amount of [an airline's] outstanding voting securities as
entitles the holder thereof to cast 10 per centum of the aggregate votes."
65. See C.A.B. Order No. 78-10-100, at 4 (Oct. 20, 1978).
66. 49 U.S.C. § 1378(b) (1982). The provision states that "unless, after a hearing, the
Board finds that the transaction will not be consistent with the public interest or that the
conditions of this section [regarding specific antitrust standards] will not be fulfilled, it shall,
by order, approve such transaction .... "
67. Id. The CAB reasoned that, if rigidly enforced, § 408 could effectively isolate incum-
bent management from the disciplining effects of a capital market to such a degree as would
contravene the purposes of the Airline Deregulation Act. See also C.A.B. Order 78-6-208, at 7
(June 29, 1978).
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twenty-five percent of the voting stock of National Airlines. 6' Tiger Interna-
tional Airlines was likewise permitted to acquire up to twenty-five of the
voting stock of Seaboard World Airlines.69 In each instance, the CAB sanc-
tioned the use of trust agreements which mandated proportionate voting of
shares. The CAB recognized that section 408 could be used to impede hos-
tile acquisition attempts by insulating incumbent managers from the discipli-
nary effects of the capital market.7" The CAB approved the use of voting
trusts in these cases so as not to encumber the takeover process while guard-
ing against possible anticompetitive effects.7 '
The CAB regarded the voting trust in each of these cases as an effective
means of insulating beneficial ownership from control. The CAB reasoned
that section 408 did not expressly prohibit control relationships. Instead,
the requirement of prior approval was designed to ensure that the CAB re-
view possible competitive and public interest effects of any significant
transfer.
The CAB found the voting trust arrangement in each case sufficient to
defeat the statutory presumption arising upon acquisition of twenty-five per-
cent of voting securities.7 2 The CAB also reasoned that the contested nature
of the acquisitions defeated any claims that incumbent management would
be subject to improper influence. Were it to accept the target's claim of
68. TXI/Pan American-National Acquisition, 79 C.A.B. 792 (1978).
69. C.A.B. Order No. 78-12-173, at 8-9 (Dec. 26, 1978). See Seaboard World Airlines,
Inc. v. Tiger Int'l, Inc., 600 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1979). Tiger and Seaboard are the two largest
all-cargo carriers in the United States.
70. C.A.B. Order 78-6-208, at 6. "[T]he transaction system should not be spared the
disciplines, or denied the benefits, of the capital markets. . . unless some clearly demonstrated
special circumstances is present." Id.
71. In June 1978, TXI began purchasing National Airlines stock in open market transac-
tions. Following disclosure of its 9.2% purchase to the SEC, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 78m
(1982), TXI announced its plans to effect a hostile takeover of up to 25% of National Airlines'
outstanding common stock. All shares were placed in a voting trust which mandated propor-
tionate voting of shares. C.A.B. Order No. 78-10-100, at 1, 3 n.8. Soon thereafter, Pan Am
proposed a friendly tender offer to National Airlines' stockholders. Pan Am then announced
its intent to purchase up to 25% of National Airlines' outstanding stock. In order to effect the
acquisition, Pan Am deposited all tendered shares into a voting trust. Id. at 3.
In January 1979, Tiger International announced a hostile tender offer for 9.4% of the out-
standing voting stock of Seaboard World Airlines. Together with shares already acquired on
the open market, the tender offer increased Tiger International's potential holdings to 25%.
Seaboard, 600 F.2d at 357. As with the takeover proposals of TXI and Pan Am, Tiger Inter-
national deposited all shares into a blind trust with proportionate voting of shares. C.A.B.
Order No. 78-12-173, at 7-8.
72. 49 U.S.C. § 1378(f) (1982). The CAB found that the restraints created by each of
these voting trusts rebutted the presumption that ownership of even 25% of entrusted stock
amounted to control. C.A.B. Order No. 78-10-100, at 4; C.A.B. Order No. 78-12-173, at 4-5.
[Vol. 35:761
Broadcast Licensees
unlawful transfer of control or right to a hearing, the CAB feared that sec-
tion 408(f) could be transformed into a virtual ban on hostile acquisitions.
The CAB permitted all three takeover plans to proceed, concluding that
the public interest is best served by allowing marketplace forces to operate
without needless regulatory interference.7 3
2. Rebuttable Presumption of Control
In 198 1, Texas International launched a hostile takeover seeking 48.5% of
the voting stock of Continental Air Lines.7 4 The CAB again permitted the
transaction, prior to a grant of approval under section 408(f). As in the
previous cases, the acquired securities were placed in a voting trust struc-
tured to require proportionate voting of shares. The latter trust arrangement
was unique, however, in that it permitted the trustee to vote all shares held
against Continental's approval of a proposed merger with Western Airlines.
TXI's proposal also clearly exceeded the twenty-five percent limit for
presuming a lawful transfer of control. Despite the unique features of the
transaction, the CAB was persuaded that the provisions of TXI's voting
trust adequately rebutted the presumption of control and guarded against
potential anticompetitive effects during the pendency of agency review.7"
In essence, TXI argued that its particular takeover proposal was necessary
to assure competitive equality, given the merger agreement between Conti-
nental and Western Airlines. TXI claimed that circumstances surrounding
its proposal justified the CAB's departure from strict enforcement of section
408(f). TXI further maintained that denial of its petition would allow in-
cumbent management to dictate Continental's future by denying sharehold-
ers the opportunity to choose between the offers of TXI and Western
Airlines.7 6 Finally, TXI contended that it had no alternative way to com-
pete with Western Airlines' management.7 7
In order to allow the market to function freely, the CAB granted expe-
73. TXI/Pan American-National Acquisition, 79 C.A.B. at 794-96.
74. TXI-Acquisition-Continental, 88 C.A.B. 1088 (1981).
75. Id. at 1096-97.
76. On this basis, the CAB distinguished this case from its prior ruling in the proposed
acquisition of Wein Air Alaska by Alaska Airlines. Id. at 1097. In that voting trust arrange-
ment Alaska Airlines reserved for its wholly owned subsidiary the power to veto a merger by
Wein Air with another entity. C.A.B. Order No. 79-12-158, at 6 (Dec. 21, 1979). The CAB
noted that Alaska Airlines was effectively positioning its own subsidiary in an attempt to frus-
trate the alternative merger proposal and to prevent Air Alaska's competitor from obtaining
new management or capital. Id. at 7-8.
77. 88 C.A.B. at 1090. TXI noted that even a simple proxy fight would have failed with-
out a concrete counter-offer. Moreover, the advance announcement of TXI's tender offer,
delayed until after CAB approval, would have violated SEC rule 14d-2(b) which requires an
offer to commence within five days of announcement. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1985).
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dited approval of TXI's takeover proposal. The CAB held that the statutory
presumption of unlawful control was rebutted by the checks against im-
proper influence provided in the voting trust arrangement. The CAB con-
sidered it unlikely that the reservation of a single voting right would prove
anticompetitive or adverse to the public interest. Moreover, it found that
other proportionate voting restrictions in the proposal served as effective
checks on the exercise of improper influence. The CAB recognized that reg-
ulatory approval would permit Continental's shareholders to tender their
shares for a cash premium if they chose to do so. The CAB concluded that
to disallow TXI's transfer proposal would insulate the air carrier industry
from the disciplines of the marketplace. Disapproval would also needlessly
restrict the ability of Continental's shareholders to decide what was in their
own and the corporation's best interest.7"
B. Federal Banking Agencies
A transfer of control in banking may be governed by either of two stat-
utes, depending upon the identity of the purchaser and the proportion of
shares acquired. The Change in Bank Control Act (Control Act)79 applies
to persons and proscribes the acquisition of control of any bank, insured by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, through the purchase of voting
stock "unless the appropriate Federal banking agency has been given sixty
days' prior written notice."8 For purposes of the statute, "control" is de-
fined as "the power. . . to direct the management or policies of any insured
bank or to vote 25 per centum or more of any class of voting securities."'"
Acquisition of a smaller percentage of stock may also result in control and
thereby trigger the filing requirements of the Control Act.82 The federal
banking agencies have promulgated regulations interpreting the Control
Act, which provide for a rebuttable presumption of control where ten per-
cent or more of a bank's voting securities are acquired and the bank has a
class of voting securities registered under section 12 of the 1934 Act.83 In
78. All powers and duties of the CAB under the transfer of control provisions of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 were transferred, effective Jan. 1, 1985, to the Department of
Justice by Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 1601(b)(1)(C), 92 Stat. 1745 (1978). It remains to be seen
whether the Department of Justice will adopt the same policy with respect to voting trusts.
79. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)(1) (1982).
80. Id. In addition to the prior notice requirement, the Control Act requires that the
acquiror furnish specific details to the proposed transfer of control. See id. § 1817(J)(6).
81. Id. § 1817(j)(8)(B).
82. Control may result from the power to vote 10% of shares, if the securities are publicly
registered or if after the acquisition, there is no other stockholder able to vote more than 10%
of shares. See 12 C.F.R. § 303.15(a)(1)-(2) (1985).
83. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. §§ 303.15(a), 5.50(l)(i)-(ii) (1985). This presumption was ex-
tended to the case of a hostile takeover attempt of a publicly traded company in Riggs Nat'l
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addition, the Control Act regulations allow for a "letter of nondisapproval"
from the Comptroller of the Currency. 4 The letter is significant in that by
regulation it provides a means whereby a proposed takeover could be con-
summated in advance of the sixty-day waiting period specified in the Control
Act.85 The regulation thus provides a measure of flexibility as to the limita-
tion placed upon transfers of control in banking.1
6
As an alternative to a direct purchase of voting shares, the Federal Re-
serve Board has permitted certain escrow arrangements to effect the transfer
of ownership in stock.8 7 In a recently issued regulation, the Board noted
that the use of such an arrangement pending Board approval would not vio-
late the Bank Holding Control Act (BHCA)
so long as [1] title to such shares remains with the seller during the
pendency of the application; [2] there are no other indications that
the applicant controls the shares held in escrow; and [3] in the
event of Board denial of the application, the escrow agreement pro-
vides that the shares would be returned to the seller.88
'hus the federal bank agencies have attempted to infuse some flexibility into
Bank v. Allbritton, 516 F. Supp. 164 (D.D.C. 1981). After considering the various bank regu-
latory issues, the district court eventually granted Riggs' request to enjoin the hostile takeover.
Id. at 182. Before entering the injunction, however, the court observed that Allbritton could
have rebutted the statutory presumption of control but for his failure to comply with filing and
notice requirements. Id. at 178-80. Allbritton was already a 15% shareholder of Riggs when
he proposed to acquire 5% of shares from a colleague along with an additional 15% of shares
outstanding. As a result of the combined purchase, Allbritton would surpass the 25% thresh-
old of control in the Change of Control Act. Id. at 179-80. Allbritton complied with filing
requirements for the initial 5% purchase but failed to submit proper notice for the later 15%
bid. Id.
84. 12 C.F.R. § 225.43(c)(ii) (1985). One of the elements of Allbritton's rebuttal to the
alleged statutory violations related to a "letter of nondisapproval" from the Comptroller of the
Currency. Allbritton, 516 F. Supp. at 176. The letter was issued just one month after Allbrit-
ton's notice filing. Id. In relevant part, the letter stated that the Comptroller did not intend to
oppose the proposed changes in control. Id.
85. 12 C.F.R. § 225.43(c)(ii) (1985).
86. The bidder in a hostile takeover situation, by seeking a letter of nondisapproval, could
effectively acquire control of a bank before expiration of the Hart-Scott-Rodino and Williams
Act waiting periods. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
87. Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA), § 3(a)(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(1)
(1982)). The Bank Holding Company Act pertains to transfers of control by corporate ac-
quirors rather than individuals. The statute entails even greater restrictions than the Control
Act in order to prevent bank holding companies from engaging in unlawful, nonbanking activi-
ties. The relevant provision of the BHCA proscribes any action which causes a company to
become a bank holding company without prior [Federal Reserve] Board approval. A bank
holding company is defined as any company which has control over any bank. "Control" for
purpose of the statute indicates that "the company directly or indirectly ... has power to vote
25 per centum or more of any class of voting securities of the bank." 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1),
(a)(2)(A) (1982).
88. 12 C.F.R. § 225.134(c) (1985).
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the regulation of banking, an area in which the statute sets forth strict limita-
tions on any transfer of control.89
C. Interstate Commerce Commission
In the transportation industry Congress has mandated that:
[t]he following transactions. . . may be carried out only with the
approval of the [Interstate Commerce] Commission: . . . acquisi-
tion of control of a carrier by any number of carriers; acquisition of
control of at least [two] carriers by a person that is not a carrier;
[or] acquisition of control of a carrier by a person that is not a
carrier but that controls any number of carriers. 90
Despite this general prohibition, the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) has reviewed several proposals for transferring control prior to admin-
istrative approval. In recent years, particularly, the agency has assumed a
neutral regulatory posture in order to preserve the transportation industry's
viability in the marketplace. Among the proposals deemed most acceptable
by the ICC are those which provided for voting trusts.9' As a basis for
finding a trust lawful, the ICC has required that: (1) the trustee be entirely
independent of the trust; (2) the trustee exercise its voting power in such a
way as not to cause any dependence or intercorporate relationship between
the beneficiary and the carrier trusted; and (3) the trust must be irrevocable
for a stated period of time.
92
1. Trustee Independence Required
Under these criteria, the ICC found lawfully established voting trusts im-
proper when the trustee has failed to remain independent.93 Unless the trust
89. The statute also provides that the presumption of control may be defeated to the ex-
tent that countervailing public interests exist.
90. 49 U.S.C. § 11,343(a)(3), (4), (5) (1982). Subsection (b) further provides that "[a]
person may carry out a transaction referred to in subsection (a). . . or participate in achieving
control or management . . . regardless of how that result is reached, only with the approval
and authorization of the Commission . I..." d. § 11,343(b).
91. In the case of Missouri Pac. R.R., 327 I.C.C. 279 (1965), for example, the ICC
granted approval of a voting trust implemented as part of a hostile takeover plan. The trustee
arrangement was employed in order to avoid transfer of control in a divestiture of stock pro-
ceeding. Id. at 320.
92. Id. at 319. See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 421 (N.D. Ill. 1966),
afl'd, 385 U.S. 457 (1967). In affirming the ICC's reasoning in the Missouri Pacific case, the
court stated: "[tiemporary control . . . by a trustee charged with the specific duty of in-
dependent action is not of itself the first step on the road to centralized control of railroads."
263 F. Supp. at 429.
93. Thereafter, the ICC considered other transfer of control proposals in East Texas Mo-
tor Freight Lines, Inc., 109 M.C.C. 213 (1969), and Alleghany Corp., 109 M.C.C. 333 (1970).
The ICC distinguished the East Texas and Alleghany cases as examples of transactions in
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is entirely independent, the ICC has regarded the trustee as an extension of
the acquiring carrier. For example, in the case of Eastern Freight Ways,
Inc.,94 the ICC approved a voting trust devised as part of a hostile takeover
plan. In 1975, Eastern initiated a hostile tender offer for control of another
transport carrier. The bid was designed to oust ineffectual management who
also held controlling stock in the company. As support for its transfer pro-
posal, Eastern argued that incompetent management should not be insulated
from removal due to the strictures of section 5.
The voting trust arrangement proposed by Eastern was generally irrevoca-
ble for a period of ten years. The trust could be cancelled, however, follow-
ing the sale of stock or the receipt of transfer of control approval by the ICC.
The trustee was accorded full and independent voting powers in exchange
for the duty to exercise that vote so as to further competent management.
The trustee was also required not to dispose of the target's assets, alter its
capital structure, or permit it to merge with another corporate entity. The
trustee violated this last restriction over a year after the trust's initiation.
For this reason, the ICC found a loss of trustee independence sufficient to
disapprove Eastern's transfer proposal. 95
2. Competitive Equity and Public Benefits
Upon rehearing of Eastern's petition, however, the ICC sanctioned the
acquiror's combined tender offer and voting trust arrangement. The ICC
recognized that given the hostile nature of the acquisition, Eastern was com-
pelled to abide by SEC laws9 6 which were ipso facto incompatible with the
requirements of section 5. Strict enforcement of section 5 would therefore
mean that tender offer procedures for ousting ineffectual management were
unavailable to regulated transport carriers.97
which the voting trusts were properly established but failed to remain independent. Once the
stock was placed in trust, the existing directors of each company were removed from office.
The trustee therefore remained the only viable management prospect. The trustee was no
longer independent but rather had become a party to the transaction. The ICC acknowledged
that "nothing was stated in those cases indicating that voting trusts if independent could not be
utilized." Eastern Freight Ways, Inc., 122 M.C.C. 143, 146 (1975). Accord B.F. Goodrich Co.
v. Northwest Indust., 303 F. Supp. 53 (D. Del. 1969), aff'd, 424 F.2d 1349, cert. denied, 400
U.S. 822 (1971).
94. Eastern Freight Ways, Inc., 122 M.C.C. 143 (1975).
95. 122 M.C.C. 267 (1975).
96. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)-(f) (1982), which requires that payment be made for tendered
stock within 60 days of the tender offer.
97. The ICC concluded that: "This should be reason enough for the Commission to allow
large publicly held carriers to be bought out through the use of properly established indepen-
dent voting trusts .... In this way, ineffectual management can be removed, and adequate
transportation can be assured to the public." 122 M.C.C. at 153.
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Eastern's petition for rehearing was also based on third party claims that
(1) the prior ICC ruling did not adequately protect the interest of creditors,
minority shareholders, and employees of the other carrier, and (2) there was
an urgent public need for the interline service terminated as a result of the
ICC's order. Eastern argued that incumbent management was incapable of
keeping the target company financially viable. Eastern also submitted evi-
dence of great public demand for its continued transport service. The ICC
acknowledged that the public should not be deprived of the benefits of trans-
port service and thereafter approved Eastern's takeover proposal.9 8 The
ICC formally authorized the placement of shares in a voting trust with an
independent trustee and further indicated that the trust could effectively
safeguard against violations of the Act even though the acquisition of shares
occurred without prior regulatory approval.9 9
Perhaps there is a lesson to be learned from the experience of other regula-
tors. Arguably, given proper safeguards, a hostile transfer of control may
lawfully transpire in advance of final FCC review and approval.
Admittedly, it defies reason to contend that a hostile takeover, in the
words of section 310(d) "does not involve a substantial change in ownership
or control." In fact, the FCC has recently indicated that the transfer of legal
control through a purchase of majority stock ownership is substantial in
terms of its prior approval requirement. The Commission has likewise iden-
tified as substantial negative control majority stock ownership that grants
the holder an absolute right to block a proposed transaction.
In this context, perhaps the message from other agencies is that the Com-
mission still has statutory authority to grant interim or emergency approval.
This is particularly true whenever a transaction is structured so as to place
the target licensee's stock into a fully separated voting trust. The Commis-
sion may allow takeover plans to move forward because, in effect, the ac-
quiror lacks the wherewithal to influence or control station operations
during the pendency of the transaction.
The experience of other regulators further suggests that while prior FCC
approval is warranted by a transfer of de jure control, the degree of scrutiny
is decreased in any situation where target management retains control over
station operations and policy. In other words, a short-form application pro-
cedure followed by expedited FCC review would seem appropriate to this
situation. In any event, the Commission must adopt a solution to the hostile
98. 122 M.C.C. at 274.
99. Id. at 267, 274. The ICC reaffirmed its neutral regulatory posture in an August 1977




takeover dilemma: one which permits market forces to operate, yet pre-
serves the FCC's statutory right ultimately to approve or disapprove a given
transaction.
III. PROBLEMS RAISED BY HOSTILE TAKEOVERS
OF PUBLICLY TRADED COMPANIES
An acquiror seeking to obtain control of a publicly traded broadcast licen-
see is subject to the requirements of the federal securities laws and the anti-
trust laws. The principal federal securities provisions regulating takeovers
are contained in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)" and par-
ticularly in the 1968 Williams Act Amendments to the 1934 Act (Williams
Act). 1 o'
Significant stock purchases and other acquisitions of voting securities or
assets are subject to the preacquisition notification and reporting require-
ments of the Clayton Act 10 2 as amended by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
improvements Act of 1976 (Hart-Scott-Rodino Act).'0 3 In addition to these
statutory and regulatory impediments to a hostile takeover, the target has
numerous defensive measures which it can implement to defeat a cash tender
or exchange offer or the accumulation of a large block of the target's
shares."° The Williams Act, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, and the takeover
defenses are discussed below.
A. Williams Act and Other Federal Securities Requirements
In promulgating the Williams Act, Congress expressly recognized that the
principle of full and fair disclosure was fundamental if the Act was to be
effective in regulating the accumulation of large blocks of a company's stock
either through formal, published tender offers or through other methods.'
The legislative history surrounding the Williams Act indicates that Congress
was particularly sensitive to situations involving potential changes in man-
100. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-kk (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
101. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-
(f) (1982)).
102. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982).
103. Pub. L. No. 90-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of tits. 15, 18,
& 28 U.S.C.).
104. See generally M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 17, at § 6.05[5]; Lynch &
Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 901
(1979); Steinbrink, Management's Response to the Takeover Attempt, 28 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 882 (1978).
105. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1967); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430
U.S. 1, 35, 39 (1977); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975).
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agement and control.10 6 As a result, Congress required persons seeking to
accumulate significant amounts of a company's voting securities to make full
disclosure of material and relevant information.
The Williams Act added sections 13(d), 14(d), and 14(e) 11 7 to the 1934
Act. These sections comprise the primary federal securities provisions gov-
erning hostile takeovers of publicly traded companies.
1. Increments of Control
Section 13(d)(1) 10 8 pertains to any person,' 0 9 who acquires more than five
percent of a class of registered equity securities.'' o That person must file a
schedule 13D statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission"'.
and provide a copy to the issuer and the exchange on which the securities are
traded. The schedule 13D statement must disclose, among other things, the
identity and background of the purchaser, the number of shares owned by
the purchaser, the source of funds used to purchase the shares, the purpose
of the acquisition of stock, and the purchaser's plans and intentions with
respect to the issuer. 12 According to section 13(d)(2)" 3 and SEC rule 13d-
2,114 the schedule 13D statement must be amended promptly whenever any
material change affects the facts set forth therein.
In calculating the percentage of securities acquired, the purchaser must
include all securities beneficially owned. A person is a beneficial owner of
shares of stock if he, directly or indirectly, has the power to vote or direct
the voting of such shares, or the right to receive or direct the receipt of the
dividends or the proceeds from the sale of such shares." 5 Also included in
the percentage of shares owned are all securities that the person has the right
to acquire through the exercise of an option, warrant, or right exercisable
within sixty days, or through conversion of securities convertible within
sixty days. 
116
Moreover, section 13(d)(3) operates to prevent a group of persons seeking
106. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633 (1982).
107. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78n(d), 78n(e) (1982).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982).
109. The term "person" includes natural persons, corporations, and other business entities.
15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(9) (1982).
110. In general, §§ 13(d) and 14(d) of the Williams Act are applicable only where the
securities being acquired or subject to the tender offer are registered pursuant to § 12 of the
1934 Act (15 U.S.C. § 781). 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(1), 78n(d) (1982).
Ill. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(a) (1985).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l)(A)-(E) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1985).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(2) (1982).
114. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2(a) (1985).
115. Id. § 240.13d-3(a).
116. Id. § 240.13d-3(d)(l).
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to evade the provisions of the statute from pooling their voting or other in-
terests in the securities of any issuer. That section provides that "[tiwo or
more persons [acting] as a partnership, limited partnership, syndicate, or
other group for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities




Section 14(d) of the 1934 Act regulates tender offers. This section not
only imposes mandatory disclosure requirements but also establishes sub-
stantive procedures for the conduct of tender offers. The term "tender offer"
has not been precisely defined.' 18 Nevertheless, a tender offer is generally
understood to refer to "a publicly made invitation addressed to all share-
holders of a corporation to tender their shares for sale at a specified
price."" 9 The courts have identified eight relevant factors in determining
whether an acquiror has commenced a tender offer: (1) active, widespread
solicitation of public shareholders; (2) solicitation for a substantial number
of shares; (3) offer of a premium over market price; (4) firm as opposed to
negotiable terms; (5) offer contingent on minimum number of shares; (6)
offer open for a limited period of time; (7) shareholders pressured to sell
their shares; and (8) publicity. '
2
1
Section 14(d) of the 1934 Act requires any person or group making a
tender offer which would result in the ownership of more than five percent of
a class of equity securities registered under the 1934 Act to disclose concur-
rently specific information deemed of relevance to shareholders. Specifically,
rule 14d-1 requires the filing of a schedule 14D-1 statement, which provides
for detailed disclosures essentially similar to those called for by a schedule
13D statement.' 2' The schedule 14D-1 statement must disclose, inter alia,
the identity and background of the offeror, the source and amount of funds
117. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (1982).
118. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 596, 598 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 873 (1974); SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, 587 F. Supp. 1248, 1252 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
119. Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1251 (1973). Certain acquisition transactions which do not
fall squarely within the conventional definition of a tender offer may nevertheless be subject to
§ 14(d). See, e.g., Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), afid, 682 F.2d
355 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983); Mid-Continent Bancshares, Inc. v.
O'Brien, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,734 (E.D. Mo. 1981).
120. Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. at 823-24; Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Indus., [1979-
1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,107 (N.D. Ohio 1979); SEC v. Carter
Hawley Hale Stores, 587 F. Supp. at 1253.
121. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3 (1985). Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1985), with 17
C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1985).
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which will be used to pay for tendered securities, any plans or proposals with
respect to the issuer, the number of shares the offeror presently owns, and
the details of any arrangements with other parties concerning shares to be
acquired. 122
As a further mandate of section 14(d), the bidder is required to hand de-
liver a copy of the schedule 14D- 1 to the target's principal executive office as
well as to any other bidder for the same class of the target's securities.12
The bidder must also give telephonic notice of the tender offer and mail the
schedule 14D- 1 to each national securities exchange upon which the particu-
lar class of securities is listed for trading. 12 4 Furthermore, all of the relevant
facts contained in schedule 14D-1 must be disseminated to holders of the
securities subject to the tender offer.
12 5
Section 14(d) imposes additional substantive obligations on any person
making a tender offer. Stockholders who tender their shares may withdraw
them during the first seven days of a tender offer or, if the offeror has not
purchased or returned their shares, at any time after sixty days from the
commencement of the offer. 12 6 Moreover, all shares tendered must be
purchased for the same price. If an offering price is increased, those who
have already tendered their shares receive the benefit of the increase.' 27 Fi-
nally, once a tender offer is commenced, rule lOb-13121 forbids the offeror
from purchasing any of the target's securities, directly or indirectly, in the
open market or otherwise outside of its tender offer.
Section 14(e) proscribes material misstatements, misleading omissions,
and fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative conduct in connection with any
tender or exchange offer. 12 9 In order to avoid coercive and potentially
fraudulent tender offer practices, rule 14e-l(a) establishes a minimum tender
offer period of twenty business days from the date the offer is first dissemi-
nated to security holders.'
30
122. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1985).
123. 15 U.S.C. § 72n(d)(1) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3(a)(2)(i)-(ii) (1985).
124. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3(a)(3) (1985). If the securities
being acquired are authorized for quotation on NASDAQ, the bidder must give telephone
notice of the tender offer and mail the schedule 14D- 1 to the National Association of Securities
Dealers.
125. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982).
126. Id. § 78n(d)(5). The seven-day withdrawal period contained in the Williams Act has
been extended to 15 business days by the SEC. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a)(1) (1985).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1982). The Williams Act also provides that when the number
of shares tendered exceeds the number of shares sought in the offer, those shares tendered
during the first 10 days of the offer must be purchased on a pro rata basis. Id. § 78n(d)(6).
128. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13(a) (1985).
129. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).




Changes in control of a publicly held company may occur in ways other
than upon the acquisition of voting securities. Specifically, a transfer in con-
trol may result from a change in the company's board of directors due to a
proxy contest.
In a typical proxy contest, the shareholder group attempting to oust ex-
isting management solicits proxies from the company's shareholders. An
insurgent group with even a small percentage of stock may obtain proxies
from a large block of shareholders and thereby attain a position of control.
By the next annual or special shareholders meeting, the group may have
sufficient influence to vote in new directors favorable to the group's objec-
tives. Alternatively, a shareholder group seeking to gain control of a pub-
licly traded company may solicit proxies to vote in favor of a proposed
merger or acquisition transaction.
Persons seeking to solicit proxies in favor of a change in directors or a
proposed merger or acquisition transaction must comply with the require-
ments of section 14(a) of the 1934 Act' 3 ' and the regulations promulgated
thereunder by the SEC.131 Section 14(a) provides that all proxy materials be
filed with and declared effective by the SEC prior to dissemination to the
company's shareholders.
The conventional proxy contest for control of a company's board of direc-
tors "has largely been replaced by the tender offer as the quicker, neater, and
cleaner method of contested corporate takeover."' 33 This is because proxy
contests typically last several months and are fraught with litigation and
public allegations of mismanagement and fraud.'3 4 Nonetheless, there are
instances where the proxy contest has been employed as an effective means
of transferring control.
In Teleprompter Cable Systems, "' for example, Teleprompter's largest
shareholder, Jack Kent Cooke, initiated a solicitation of proxies following a
conviction of the company's president for bribery and other unlawful activi-
ties in connection with obtaining a cable franchise. 136 Notwithstanding
compliance with the requirements of the federal securities laws, the FCC
found that a potential violation of section 310(d) occurred when Tele-
prompter's shareholders elected the new board of directors without ob-
131. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982).
132. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to -12, 240.14a-101 to -102 (1985).
133. M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 17, at § 1.04[7].
134. Id.
135. 40 F.C.C.2d 1027 (1973).
136. Id. at 1028-29.
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taining the Commission's approval.' 37 The FCC realized that immediate
shareholder action was necessary to avert damage to the company's reputa-
tion and competitive position. The FCC also recognized the exigencies of a
proxy fight and the constraints imposed by the federal securities laws in con-
nection with a proxy solicitation. Significantly, the Commission approved
the prior transfer of control in Teleprompter based upon the unusual circum-
stances of the case and the fact that Mr. Cooke kept the FCC fully informed
of his efforts to effect the change in directors. 138
4. Free Market Policy
There is little question that by imposing the requirements of the federal
securities laws, and, in particular, the Williams Act, Congress intended to
protect the target's shareholders.' 39 Nevertheless, a major aspect of the ef-
fort to protect the target's shareholders was to avoid favoring either manage-
ment or the takeover bidder. Congress expressly recognized "that takeover
bids should not be discouraged because they serve a useful purpose in pro-
viding a check on entrenched but inefficient management."" As Senator
Williams explained, "[w]e have taken extreme care to avoid tipping the
scales in favor of management or in favor of the persons making the takeover
bids."'
14 1
In a hostile takeover situation, time is of the essence.142 Extended delays
serve only to deter takeover attempts or make such attempts more diffi-
cult. 1 3 Delay eliminates the element of surprise, and, more importantly,
delay affords incumbent management the opportunity to resort to a variety
of defensive maneuvers to thwart the attempted takeover. 14' In addition, the
specter of lengthy delays may discourage potential acquirors from initiating
offers and thereby serve to insulate inefficient management from legitimate
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1031.
139. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. at 35; Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422
U.S. at 58.
140. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
141. 113 CONG. REC. 24,664 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams).
142. Delay has been characterized as "the most potent weapon in a tender offer fight."
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 637 n. 12 (quoting Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legisla-
tion: Interests, Effects, and Political Competency, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 213, 238 (1977)); see
also Wachtell, Special Tender Offer Litigation Tactics, 32 Bus. LAW 1433, 1437-42 (1977).
143. Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1277-78 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
144. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 637-38. See M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra
note 17, at § 6.05[51[a].
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takeover bids, all to the detriment of the target's shareholders.
45
In sum, shareholders are protected under the Williams Act through a free
market approach. The function of the Williams Act is to get relevant infor-
mation to the shareholders of the target company and then to allow the
shareholders to decide for themselves. Once the required disclosures have
been made, the takeover bidder is free to acquire the tendered shares within
the time frame provided by the statute.
B. Hart-Scott-Rodino Act
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act became effective in September 1978 and ad-
ded section 7A to the Clayton Act. 14 6 The Act is enforced by the Federal
Trade Commission and the Department of Justice. The Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act prevents substantial mergers, tender offers, stock purchases, and other
acquisitions of voting securities or assets from being consummated until both
the FTC and the DOJ have had an opportunity to review the proposed
transactions for compliance with federal antitrust laws.
1. Pertinent "Size" Test
The Act applies to acquisitions that meet both the size-of-person and the
size-of-acquisition tests. Under the size-of-person test, the acquisition must
involve one entity with total assets of at least $100 million and another entity
with total assets of at least $10 million."' Under the size-of-the-acquisition
test, the acquisition must result in the acquiror holding at least fifteen per-
cent of the voting securities or assets of the acquired entity, or an aggregate
total amount of voting securities and assets of the acquired entity in excess of
$15 million. 14'
2. Prenotification, Waiting Periods, and Early Termination
The importance of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act for hostile takeovers is to
forestall the consummation of reportable acquisitions until prior notification
is filed with the FTC and DOJ and a waiting period has either expired or is
prematurely terminated by the agencies.
The initial waiting period for contested acquisitions may be either fifteen
calendar days in the case of a cash tender offer, or thirty calendar days in the
case of any acquisition effected through open market purchases or negotiated
145. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 635; Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690
F.2d 558, 568 (6th Cir. 1982); Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181, 190 (3d Cir. 1980).
146. 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1982).
147. Id. § 18a(a)(2).
148. Id. § 18a(a)(3). The statutory size-of-acquisition test has been modified by regulations
to provide certain exceptions.
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purchases from existing shareholders.' 49 Both waiting periods are triggered
by the acquired person's notice filing.'50 Both the FTC and the DOJ have
the power to request additional information from either party to the acquisi-
tion within the initial waiting period.' 5 ' Generally, the request for addi-
tional information extends the waiting period ten calendar days following
compliance with the information request in the case of cash tender offers and
twenty calendar days in any other case.' 52
An important caveat in the context of hostile takeovers is that the FTC
and DOJ may prematurely terminate a waiting period sua sponte or on writ-
ten request.' 5 3 Such termination is effective at the time the requesting party
receives a telephone notice from the reviewing agencies.
3. Effect on Stock Acquisitions
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act does not change the criteria for substantive
antitrust analysis; rather, its impact relates to the timing of acquisitions.
Stock acquisitions are still analyzed to determine whether there is a violation
of section 7 of the Clayton Act'54 or of sections 1 or 2 of the Sherman
Act.' 55 The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act and the regulations promulgated there-
under affect only the date of consummation of acquisitions subject to its
provisions. The Act and regulations do not impose restrictions on the mini-
mum notice or duration period for tender offers nor do they change the time
periods applicable to the making of a tender offer under the Williams Act
and the SEC tender offer rules.
In enacting the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, Congress again recognized the
deleterious consequences of delay in situations involving an unfriendly trans-
fer of control.' 56 The Act was drafted to minimize these consequences and
thereby reaffirm the neutral policy toward takeovers embodied in the Wil-
liams Act. Thus, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act permits an acquiror to proceed
with its acquisition of the target company's securities or assets following the
expiration or early termination of the statutory waiting period.
149. Id. § 18a(b)(1)(A)-(B).
150. Id. § 18a(b)(1)(A).
151. Id. § 18a(e)(1).
152. Id. § 18a(e)(2).
153. Id. § 18a(b)(2).
154. Id. § 18.
155. Id. §§ 1-2.
156. 122 CONG. REC. 30,877 (1976) (statement of Rep. Rodino); H.R. REP. No. 1373, 94th




Any company that becomes the target of a hostile takeover may have nu-
merous defenses available to thwart an acquiror. Among these are (1) the
commencement of litigation; (2) the arranging of a defensive merger; (3) the
sale of a target's valuable assets (crown jewels) to a third party; and (4) the
securing of an alternative friendly buyer (white knight)." 7
1. Commencement of Litigation
Upon learning of an unsolicited tender offer or other bid for control of the
target, the target company may undertake litigation. The purpose of the
litigation is to thwart or delay the consummation of the takeover. The target
usually asserts every conceivable challenge to the proposed acquisition. The
litigation itself generally focuses on alleged inadequacies or misleading dis-
closures in the acquiror's schedule 13D or schedule 14D-1 filings and viola-
tions of the antitrust laws.
In Chromalloy American Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 15 8 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit expressly recognized the tac-
tical significance of certain takeover litigation. The target alleged that the
acquiror's schedule 13D failed to make proper disclosures with respect to
the acquiror's intent to control the target. The court found that the acquiror
had violated section 13(d) of the Williams Act by inadequately disclosing in
its schedule 13D filing the intent to control the target. The court therefore
enjoined further purchases of the target's stock until the acquiror filed an
amended schedule 13D.' 5 9 While the target failed to defeat the takeover, the
target did cause significant delays in the ultimate consummation of the
takeover. "6
Litigation has been employed by licensees to defend against hostile take-
over attempts. The American Express contested tender offer for McGraw-
Hill, Inc., is illustrative. In January 1979, American Express announced its
tender offer to acquire all of the issued and outstanding shares of McGraw-
Hill. '6 McGraw Hill promptly filed suit in state and federal court seeking
to block American Express' offer. McGraw-Hill alleged that the combina-
tion would violate antitrust and federal securities laws. 162 American Ex-
157. See generally M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 17, at ch. 6; Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 457 U.S. at 638 n.13.
158. 611 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1979).
159. Id. at 243, 248-49.
160. Id. at 249.
161. Firm Withdraws Contested Offer For McGraw-Hill, Wall St. J., Jan. 30, 1979, at 3, col.
162. Id.
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press subsequently withdrew its offer in the face of McGraw-Hill's strong
opposition to the proposed acquisition.
163
More recently, in Warner Communications, Inc. v. Murdoch, 164 Warner
Communications was the target of an attempted takeover by The News Cor-
poration, Ltd., its wholly owned subsidiary, News International, and the
principal owner of News Corporation and News International, Keith Rupert
Murdoch. After acquiring 6.7% of Warner's outstanding common stock in
the open market, News Corporation and News International filed a schedule
13D statement. News Corporation and News International made additional
open market purchases of Warner common stock and filed an amendment to
their 13D statement disclosing the additional purchases.1
65
Among the defensive tactics employed by Warner's management to
thwart the Murdoch Group's acquisition of control of Warner was the insti-
tution of a lawsuit against the Murdoch Group. The complaint charged that
the 13D Statements filed by News Corporation and News International were
false and misleading in various respects and that the Murdoch Group's ac-
quisition of Warner stock would create regulatory and contractual problems
for Warner.' 66 Ultimately, the Murdoch Group's attempt to take over
Warner was unsuccessful. 1
67
2. Defensive Merger
Another defense that is used by a target to block hostile changes in control
is the arrangement of a friendly defensive merger.168 The merger is usually
with a company that creates antitrust or regulatory barriers for suspected or
potential acquirors. 169 Some analysts believe that the recently announced
merger of Capital Cities Broadcasting, Inc., and American Broadcasting
Companies, Inc. (ABC), was arranged to prevent ABC from being the target
of a hostile takeover.' 7 ° As a result of the merger, it would be very difficult
for any other broadcast licensee to obtain control of either ABC or Capital
Cities because the acquisition might result in significant divestitures.
163. Id.
164. 581 F. Supp. 1482 (D. Del. 1984).
165. Id. at 1485.
166. Id. at 1487.
167. Schrage, Murdoch Agrees to Buy a 50 Percent Share of 20th Century Fox Film, Wash.
Post, Mar. 1, 1985, at BI, col. 3.
168. See M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 17, at § 6.02[6].
169. Id.
170. Vise, Turner Indicates that He's Still Interested in Acquiring a Network, Wash. Post,
Mar. 21, 1985, at BI, col. 2.
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3. Sale of Valuable Assets
Where the target has a crown jewel, the sale of that asset is yet another
defense that a target could use to defeat a hostile takeover. 7 ' In Whittaker
Corp. v. Edgar, '72 the court denied the acquiror's motion for a preliminary
injunction against the target's sale of its medical division to American Home
Products. Similarly, in Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 173 the court refused
to invalidate an agreement giving BATUS (a white knight) a one-year right
of first refusal on certain of Marshall Field's assets. An even more extreme
response to a threatened takeover is a target company's effort to undertake a
disaggregation transaction, which could involve sale of a division or partial
liquidation. 1
74
When the target is a broadcast station, the station's management could
contract or grant an option to sell valuable operating assets. The longer the
delay in effecting the transfer of control, the greater the opportunity for the
target licensee to arrange for the sale of its crown jewel. To the potential
acquiror, there is a significant deterrent effect in the possibility of lengthy
delays or sale of the target licensee's valuable assets during this interim
period.
4. Securing an Alternative Purchaser
Another defensive strategy for the target of a hostile takeover attempt is to
find an alternative buyer for the target's stock. To ensure that this white
knight becomes the successful bidder, targets may employ various "lock up"
devices. For example, the target may sell the white knight common stock or
preferred stock with special voting rights. Alternately, the target could sell
or grant the white knight an option to purchase either common or preferred
stock.
This strategy was employed successfully by Warner Communications in
defeating the hostile takeover attempt mounted by the Murdoch Group.' 75
Soon after the Murdoch Group announced its acquisition of a significant
percentage of Warner stock, Warner entered into a binding agreement with
Chris-Craft and its subsidiary BHC providing for an exchange of stock.,
76
Pursuant to this agreement, Warner agreed to issue BHC shares of preferred
voting stock representing approximately nineteen percent of the total voting
power of all outstanding securities. The agreement also entailed provisions
171. M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 17, at § 6.05[5][d][ii].
172. 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
173. 437 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
174. M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 17, at § 6.05[5][e].
175. See Warner Communications, Inc. v. Murdoch, 581 F. Supp. 1482 (D. Del. 1984).
176. Id. at 1485.
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designed to present the dilution of voting power. 177 Additionally, the stock
had a "put" provision whereby BHC could require Warner to repurchase
the stock if any shareholder unaffiliated with Chris-Craft acquired 33.3% or
more of the Warner common stock then outstanding. The repurchase price
would equal the highest price paid by the 33.3% shareholder for any shares
purchased within the preceding six-month period.1 78 The net effect of the
exchange agreement was to secure Chris-Craft as a white knight alternative
and to make any takeover of Warner by the Murdoch Group more costly
and difficult.
In summary, the target company in a hostile takeover situation can em-
ploy any one of a combination of defensive measures. The most important
element in a hostile takeover is time. There can be little question that delay
favors incumbent management. As discussed above, the Williams Act and
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act impose various disclosure, filing, and waiting re-
quirements that must be complied with by a hostile acquiror. Nevertheless,
these legislative efforts reflect a policy of strict neutrality toward contested
acquisitions. Congress carefully drafted these statutes to protect a target's
shareholders while at the same time permitting the free operation of market
forces.
Congress, the courts, and leading commentators have all recognized the
salutory purposes served by changes in corporate control. Because delay is a
weapon employed by entrenched management to defeat takeovers, the
scheme of federal regulations governing struggles for corporate control pro-
vides for minimal delays in the transfer of control. When a hostile takeover
involves a publicly traded licensee, the Commission should likewise adopt a
policy of impartiality between acquirors and incumbent management.
Otherwise, imposing significant delays on an acquiror's exercise of control
over a licensee target tips the balance in favor of existing management. In
Chairman Fowler's words:
[t]here is a significant public interest here, at least from my stand-
point. We need to ensure that our processes are used neither to
discourage nor encourage, neither to impede nor artificially expe-
dite such a process before the Commission; that is, we ought to be
the impartial umpire, administering [section 310(d)] of the Com-
munications Act in as fair and impartial a manner as we can.' 79
As discussed below, the FCC should construe its regulatory authority con-
177. Id. at 1486.
178. Id.




sistent with the purpose and policy of the Communications Act to maintain
this delicate balance.
IV. BASIS FOR FCC REVIEW OF HOSTILE TAKEOVERS
A. Support from Legislative History
1. Radio Act of 1927
The transfer-of-control limitations in the Communications Act actually
derive from legislation in 1927.18° It was the Radio Act of that year that
established the Federal Radio Commission on an experimental, temporary
basis.18' During the debates preliminary to passage of the Radio Act, Con-
gress recognized that due to the limitations of the broadcast spectrum, there
should be some limitation upon the number of stations licensed. 182 "Notions
of scarcity, frequency interference, and the unique pervasiveness of mass me-
dia were used to justify relatively intrusive regulation ... 183 Congress
also contended that licenses should be issued only to those stations whose
operations would render a benefit to the public or would contribute to the
development of radio generally.
Members of both House and Senate committees, espousing greater regula-
tion of radio, noted that there was no restraint in the existing law upon the
ight of a licensee to transfer its license. At the time, several congressmen
were concerned about trafficking in radio licenses and stations for prices far
in excess of reasonable value.'8 4 Thus, in relevant part, section 12 of the
Radio Act provides:
The station license required hereby, the frequencies or wave length
or lengths authorized to be used by the licensee, and the rights
therein granted shall not be transferred, assigned, or in any man-
ner, either voluntarily or involuntarily, disposed of to any person,
firm, company, or corporation without the consent in writing of
the licensing authority.
8 5
Legislative proposals for other sections of the Radio Act addressed 1927
concerns as to the impact upon the economy of unfair competition. One
180. Congress' 1927 legislation was in turn patterned on the Interstate Commerce Act.
181. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927). The Radio Act granted the FRC
full powers as a regulatory agency for one year. The Commission was then to become a part-
time tribunal with only appellate powers. The FRC's full-time status was perpetuated by stat-
ute and enabling legislation over the next few years.
182. S. REP. No. 772, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1926).
183. Bazelon, Student Symposium: Communications Regulation, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 442
(1981).
184. S. REP. No. 772, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1926).
185. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 12, 44 Stat. 1162, 1167 (1927).
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report specifically noted that "[a]ll laws of the United States relating to un-
lawful restraints and monopolies and . . . agreements in restraint of trade
are hereby declared to be applicable to the manufacture and sale of...




The potential perceived threat of monopoly power created fears that radio
broadcasters would provide inferior service and that listeners would be de-
prived of important information services. Because radio broadcasting was
advertiser supported, some congressmen believed that, absent extensive reg-
ulation, listeners would have no direct influence on the content of any
broadcast. ' 7
The legislative history of the Radio Act, therefore, suggests that Congress
was not so much concerned with the existence of control in a broadcast li-
censee as it was with the unlawful exercise of controlling influence to the
detriment of the public interest.
2. Communications Act of 1934
In drafting the Communications Act of 1934,88 Congress patterned its
new transfer-of-control provision upon the language of prior section 12.
Pursuant to section 310(d),"8 9 the FCC's authority was extended to cover
applications for transfer of stock control in a licensee corporation. The
Commission's authority was also broadened to require full information from
the transferring parties before passing upon an application.' 90 Congress re-
frained from defining "control" suspecting that this would limit the meaning
of the term in an unworkable manner. As a result, the concept of control
has been open to varying interpretations by the FCC and those entities sub-
ject to its regulatory oversight. Broadly construed, the term may include
every form of control, whether actual or legal, direct or indirect, negative or
affirmative.' 9'
By amendment in 1952, Congress recommended certain procedural
changes to section 310(d). The imprecise nature of existing language was
186. See CONF. REP. ON H.R. 9971 FOR THE REGULATION OF RADIO COMMUNICATION,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, S. Doc. No. 200, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1927).
187. See generally H.R. REP. No. 464, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926).
188. Pursuant to the Act, Congress abolished the Radio Commission and established the
FCC in its stead. Regulation of all forms of communications was consolidated under its re-
view. The FCC, therefore, replaced the supervisory functions of the Secretary of Commerce
and the Interstate Commerce Commission. See generally B. SCHWARTZ, THE ECONOMIC
REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY (1973).
189. 47 U.S.C. § 3 10(d) (1982). See supra notes 5, 22.
190. See H.R. REP. No. 1918, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. (1934).
191. See H.R. REP. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1934). See Rochester Telephone, 23
F. Supp. at 636.
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thought responsible for the Commission's previously disparate treatment of
transfer-of-control applications. The suggested revisions were intended to
clarify the FCC's standard for approving or disallowing transfer-of-control
applications. 92 As set forth in section 310(d) and related provisions, that
standard is one of public interest, convenience, and necessity. The Commis-
sion is also accorded great discretion in determining how that standard may
be satisfied.
B. Public Interest Standard and FCC Discretion
The guiding principle enunciated by Congress is that the FCC must act as
the "public interest, convenience, or necessity requires." Section 303 reiter-
ates this standard of public interest, convenience, and necessity found
throughout Chapter III. Because the Communications Act nowhere defines
"public interest," this standard grants the FCC broad discretion in the exer-
cise of its duties. Section 303 also empowers the Commission to make such
rules as necessary to discharge its authority. However, the public interest
rubric does not confer unlimited power upon the FCC. Rather, the principle
is to be construed by its context, by the nature of radio transmission and
reception, and by the scope and quality of services rendered."' 93 Moreover,
the FCC is not constrained by the doctrine of stare decisis. 94 As with other
administrative agencies, the Commission may depart from a prior trend of
rulings if it provides a cogent explanation for its departure.
9 5
Given the nascent status of broadcasting when the Communications Act
was drafted, there was no sufficient regulatory expertise upon which to base
detailed standards for limiting the FCC's discretion.196 Pursuant to its en-
abling legislation, the Commission was given a comprehensive mandate to
"encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public inter-
est."' 9 7 Congress specifically refrained from any attempt to itemize the
FCC's powers, however, fearing that this would frustrate the purposes for
which the Communications Act was promulgated. "That would have ster-
otyped the powers of the Commission to specific details in regulating a field
192. See S. REP. No. 44, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951). The amendment also extended
§ 310(d) to cover applications for transfer of construction permits.
193. FRC v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 285 (1933).
194. AVCO case, 3 RAD. REG. (P & F) at 17.
195. WOKO, Inc. v. FCC, 153 F.2d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
196. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1982). This provision delineates the powers and duties of the Com-
mission. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
197. Section 303(g) permits the Commission to "encourage the larger and more effective
use of radio in the public interest" and § 303(r) allows the Commission to "[m]ake such rules
and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as
may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter."
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of enterprise the dominant characteristic of which is the rapid pace of its
unfolding."' 98 Moreover, the FCC's discretion is not absolute. Rather its
directive by statute is "to provide to the people a fair, efficient, and equitable
distribution of radio service." Thus, the Commission is free to exercise its
expert judgment in hostile takeover situations but it cannot act arbitrarily or
capriciously. '99
V. ALTERNATIVE THEORIES CONSISTENT WITH FCC POLICY
A. Separating De Facto from De Jure Control
1. Voting Trust Arrangements
Prior to Jack Kent Cooke's recent unsuccessful billion dollar bid for Mul-
timedia, Inc., 2" the FCC's only precedent involving voting trust arrange-
ments occurred in the context of a voluntary transfer of control.2"' Whether
the trust provides sufficient insulation to assure that the trustee may exercise
full voting rights free from the influence of the beneficial owner is the fore-
most concern of the FCC.2" 2 In Westinghouse Broadcasting, Inc. v. Tele-
prompter Corp.,2"3 for example, Westinghouse Broadcasting proposed to
place its one-third acquisition of Teleprompter Corporation's shares into a
voting trust. The trust was subject to the indirect control of Teleprompter's
board of directors in all matters except those directly relating to the merger.
Westinghouse also agreed that it would refrain from effecting any changes to
Teleprompter's management pending the Commission's approval of the
transfer. The trust was to terminate with FCC approval, following Tele-
prompter's merger with another company or upon Westinghouse's with-
drawal of all stock deposited in trust.2"
The FCC regarded the voting trust arrangement as sufficient to insure that
198. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940) (referring to § 303(g) of
the Act); Heitmeyer v. FCC, 95 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1937). Both cases involved transfer of a
construction permit.
199. American Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 374 (S.D.N.Y.), affTd, 347
U.S. 284 (1953).
200. In re One-Two Corp., 58 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 924 (1985).
201. CBS' Lawyers Launch a Pre-Emptive Strike, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 25, 1985, at 28, 31.
202. Moreover, a great number of the cases decided by the Commission arise in the context
of the FCC's multiple ownership or cross-ownership rules as opposed to its rules regarding
transfer of control. Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, 68 F.C.C.2d 1302 (Aug. 16,
1978).
203. 84 F.C.C.2d 938 (1981).
204. 84 F.C.C.2d at 946-47. Similarly, in Bonneville Int'l Corp., 68 F.C.C.2d 933 (1977),
the Commission approved a voting trust as a means of insulating stock ownership which would
otherwise violate its multiple ownership and cross-ownership rules. The Commission granted
a waiver of both proscriptions in part because the shares held in trust were labelled investment
letter stock and constituted only a minority interest.
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control over Teleprompter would remain unchanged during the pendency of
Westinghouse's transfer application. The Commission's view was not al-
tered by the fact that one incident of control, namely the trustee power to
vote Westinghouse's stock in favor of the proposed merger, did in fact occur
upon completion of the stock purchase. The FCC reasoned that this element
of change was insufficient alone to require invocation of section 310 transfer-
of-control procedures. "This is particularly the case here where the change
proposed has otherwise been fully disclosed to the Commission in advance,
[and] involves neither clear positive nor negative control with respect to...
the merger. "'205
In the deluge of recent hostile takeover proposals, the FCC has had occa-
sion to reassess its approach to section 310(d) regulation. In One-Two Cor-
poration, 106 Jack Kent Cooke proposed to make a hostile tender offer for
controlling interest in Multimedia, Inc., the licensee of numerous radio and
television stations. Cooke acknowledged that his planned acquisition would
require a long-form application, with the attendant waiting periods and op-
portunity for filing petitions to deny. Cooke urged, however, that requiring
completion of this drawn-out procedure before his tender offer could move
forward would, in effect, afford management an unfair advantage in the
contest.
Cooke suggested instead a two-step proposal. The first step involved FCC
short-form approval of a voting trust under which the trustee could collect
any stock tendered in response to Cooke's offer. In step two, Cooke submit-
ted a long-form transfer application averring that if the trustee collected suf-
ficient shares to acquire a controlling interest, Cooke would remain detached
from the operation or management of Multimedia until completion of the
FCC's review process.2" 7
For the first time in a hostile takeover context, the FCC approved Cooke's
proposed voting trust arrangement. As a basis for its decision, the Commis-
sion observed that the trustee had "highly restricted incidences of ownership
or control." The Commission also declined to regard movement of stock to
the trustee as a "substantial" transfer of control,2 °8 and even so, the Com-
205. 84 F.C.C.2d at 951 (emphasis added). Thus, Westinghouse's acquisition of minority
shareholder interests in Teleprompter did not amount to transfer of de jure or de facto control
for purposes of § 310(d). See In re Wolverine Cablevision, Inc., 69 F.C.C.2d 1487, 1493 app.
(1978). The FCC approved transfer of control again in the context of its cross-ownership rules
in part because by terms of the trust agreement, the trustee retained sole voting rights in the
acquired stock and had authority to sell that stock without approval of the licensee.
206. In re One-Two Corp., 58 RAD. REG. 2D (P & F) 924 (1985).
207. Id. at 925-26.
208. 47 U.S.C. § 309(c)(2)(B) (1982).
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mission was willing to authorize the transfer on an interim basis.2 °9 In the
Commission's view there could be no risk of prejudice if it eventually denied
Cooke's long-form application, because the funds expended could still be
recouped through a sale of stock by the trustee to another approved
buyer.210
The FCC has also approved other methods of separating de facto from de
jure transfer of control. Among these are the use of irrevocable proxies,
unexercised stock options, and the placement of purchased securities in es-
crow. In the event of a hostile takeover, any one of these alternatives could
be used to effect lawful transfer of control. Following are examples of take-
over alternatives, with the caveat that existing case law is typically illustra-
tive of voluntary rather than contested acquisitions.
2. Irrevocable Proxies
As early as 1944, the FCC issued approval under section 310(d) for a
transfer of control involving an irrevocable proxy agreement. In the case of
Falknor and Schepp, 211 the parties admitted to undertaking transfer without
prior Commission approval. Specifically, their transfer agreement provided
for transfer of forty-nine percent of the licensee broadcast station's outstand-
ing stock. An option agreement was also negotiated under which the trans-
feree received the option to purchase Falknor's remaining one percent of
stock. Finally, an irrevocable proxy given by Falknor to the transferee's at-
torney authorized the latter to vote the one percent share. In allowing the
transfer to proceed, the FCC noted that the parties made every effort to
inform the Commission of their negotiations.212
The FCC considered the transfer proposal of Falknor and Schepp in 1944,
several years before issuing its Procedures on Transfer and Assignment of
Licenses. 21 3 The case presents an early example of the Commission's will-
ingness to sanction a transfer of control in the absence of prior section
310(d) approval. The proposed transaction was one in which ultimate legal
ownership in the licensee was evenly shared and in which policy for the
broadcast station could be established only by mutual agreement. Thus, fol-
lowing a narrow interpretation of section 310(d), the transfer of even one
209. Id. § 309(0.
210. 58 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) at 925-26. One week after the Commission's decision,
Cooke abandoned his tender offer for a $25 million profit. See Cooke Out of the Race for
Multimedia at $25 Million Profit, BROADCASTING, July 22, 1985, at 34.
211. In re Application of Falknor and Schepp, 10 F.C.C. 401 (1944).
212. Id. at 405. But see In re Albert J. Feyl (Press-Union), 15 F.C.C. 823 (1951) (parties
claimed an inability to comply with the FCC's request for stock investment).




ownership interest provided reason enough to subject the transaction to
prior FCC review.
The Commission adopted a more flexible interpretation of the statute,
however, and found Falknor and Schepp's transfer arrangement to be law-
ful. The Commission noted that throughout the course of their negotiations,
both parties kept the FCC fully informed. Falknor and Schepp had also
requested the Commission's advice as to the legality of their conduct. Fi-
nally, the FCC observed that the combined irrevocable proxy and stock op-
tion arrangement served as effective means of separating de facto from de
jure control. In the absence of a compelling reason to deny the transfer, the
Commission decided that the public interest, convenience, and necessity
would be served by granting approval.214
The Commission reverted to a narrow interpretation of section 310(d),
however, in In re Albert J. Feyl (Press-Union).215 This case is noteworthy in
that it raises an important distinction as to the FCC's basis for adopting a
rigid as opposed to a flexible interpretation of the statute. In the Commis-
sion's view, the acquiror of Press-Union Publishing unfairly attempted to
manipulate the FCC and other agency requirements to its own business ad-
vantage. The acquiror, Bethlehems' Globe Publishing, also demonstrated
total disregard for the Commission's authority and request to be kept fully
informed of the transaction's progress.
The proposed acquisition entailed issuance of an irrevocable proxy to each
of Press-Union's stockholders following the transfer of shares to Bethlehems.
On the surface, at least, Bethlehems' proposal appeared to provide a means
for separating legal control from the exercise of controlling influence. How-
ever, the Commission was unpersuaded; it noted that the giver of the irrevo-
cable proxy in this instance could easily avoid whatever legal restrictions the
proxy placed upon it. For example, Bethlehems preserved at all times the
right to vote the licensee's stock as to fundamental business decisions. The
FCC also observed that the sale of stock was effected primarily for tax pur-
poses and for matters of personal business expediency.2" 6
One distinction raised by Press-Union appears to be that in the latter case
the irrevocable proxy employed failed to sufficiently isolate de facto from de
jure control. The FCC noted that another critical factor was Bethlehems'
right to and power over the stock and the incidents of control flowing from
its exercise. 217 The Commission decided that the potential for abuse in this
214. 10 F.C.C. at 405-06.
215. 15 F.C.C. 823 (1951).
216. Id. at 827.
217. Press-Union, 15 F.C.C. at 827. See Procedure on Transfer and Assignment of
Licenses, 4 RAD. REG. (P & F) 342 (1948). The Commission recognized that borderline cases
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instance mandated section 310(d) prior approval. Thus, in the absence of
public interest reasons to conclude otherwise, the FCC found that
Bethlehems' control of Press-Union was unlawful.
3. Unexercised Stock Options and Purchased Securities in Escrow
As another means of separating de facto from de jure control, the FCC
has permitted the use of unexercised stock options. The Commission's ra-
tionale for approving such arrangements is that the party purchasing the
option has no present interest in the shares. Absent any present interest, the
party cannot invoke either actual or legal control prior to exercising the op-
tion. In Atlantic Coast Broadcasting Corp.,218 the FCC approved a transfer
of control application which provided for purchase of a minority interest in
voting shares along with an option to acquire the remainder of stock out-
standing. The FCC reasoned that the unexercised option alone did not indi-
cate relinquishment of control for purposes of section 310(d). Similarly, in
the case of M&M Broadcasting Co.,219 the Commission sanctioned an agree-
ment granting a third party an option to purchase one-half of the licensee's
stock. According to the FCC, control remained unchanged "so long as the
option holders [could] not exercise control over the day-to-day operations of
the station, dominate the licensees' affairs or intervene as to management
prerogatives."220
A variation on a stock option is an arrangement whereby the transfer-of-
control applicant purchases voting securities for cash, but then deposits the
shares in an escrow account. The ultimate acquisition of securities is held
pending section 310(d) transfer-of-control approval. The Commission ap-
proved a transaction of this nature in the case of WWS W, Inc.2 21 The Com-
mission reasoned that the escrow arrangement did not effect any personal
transfer of title or voting rights in the purchased shares. The escrow ar-
rangement, therefore, insulated the incidents of control sufficient to comply
with section 310(d).
may exist, but that in such cases, uncertainty should be resolved by bringing the complete facts
of the proposed transfer to the attention of the Commission in advance of undertaking the
acquisition.
218. 22 RAD. REG. (P & F) 1045 (1962). The Commission reasoned that an unexercised
option alone does not represent relinquishment of control. Id. at 1050-51.
219. 26 F.C.C. 35 (1959).
220. Id. at 73.
221. 14 RAD. REG. (P & F) 587 (1956). The Commission sanctioned the escrow arrange-
ment even though certain provisions thereof vested in the applicant's shareholders negative
control over certain affairs of the licensee without prior regulatory approval.
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B. Special Temporary Authorization
If the grant of an application for transfer of control is otherwise permitted
by law, the FCC may issue a temporary authorization. As the basis for issu-
ing such a grant, the Commission must indicate extraordinary circumstances
to justify temporary operations. It must also find that delay in the com-
mencement of operations would jeopardize the public interest.222
The FCC recognized extraordinary circumstances in the analogous com-
mon carrier situation of Pacific Power and Light Co."23 In that case, the
Commission granted the acquiror interim authorization to proceed with its
planned acquisition of Telephone Utilities, Inc. (TU). The proposal entailed
transfer of fifty-one percent stock ownership in TU and the placement of
those shares in a voting trust. The acquisition was opposed by Continental
Telephone Corporation by virtue of its simultaneous tender offer for forty
percent of TU's common and preferred shares. Continental's plan involved
the exchange of large quantities of stock between the parties as well as the
exercise of a voting trust arrangement.
The FCC conceded that under ordinary circumstances it would delay con-
sideration of Pacific's application until after formal section 310(d) review.
Given the competitive nature of the takeover struggle, however, the Com-
mission noted that delay would be tantamount to defeating Pacific's acquisi-
tion plans. The FCC recognized that its regulatory procedures should not be
used to obstruct the plans of an otherwise qualified acquiror in a legitimate
struggle for corporate control. "To preserve Pacific's position vis a vis Con-
tinental and to prevent the use of our own procedures and processes to deter-
mine the substantive results of the contest, we believe the situation demands
some form of extraordinary action." ''"4 As a basis for granting Pacific spe-
cial temporary authorization, the Commission noted that section 310(d) spe-
cifically empowers it to authorize the transfer of rights under a license. In
terms of contested takeover struggles, the FCC interpreted "rights" to indi-
cate something less than complete control; a grant of temporary authority
that would allow the takeover process to proceed without undue regulatory
restraints. Thus, Pacific received interim approval to exchange the stock in
question and to exercise its voting trust.2 2 5 The Commission concluded:
222. Communications Act, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(f), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-
259, § 114, 96 Stat. 1087, 1094 (1982). Special temporary authorization may extend for a
period not to exceed 180 days. The statute also requires that the FCC issue a statement of its
reasons for issuing such a grant.
223. 42 F.C.C.2d 375 (1973). Pacific's petition involved a contested takeover of a common
carrier (rather than a broadcast) license.
224. Id. at 378.
225. Id. The FCC specifically conditioned its grant of interim authority so as to forbid
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"Our sole purpose in taking this action is to maintain parity between the
competitive efforts of these contending parties in an unusual situation for
which there are no exact precedents.
226
Some of the issues inherent in the Commission's grant of special tempo-
rary authorization gained notoriety in Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC. 227 In
that case, the Supreme Court examined the comparative hearing require-
ment under section 309(e) in the context of two mutually exclusive applica-
tions for transfer of control.228  Because comparative hearings may evolve
into protracted and detailed affairs, the FCC has identified certain public
policy reasons for special authorization to new or existing broadcast ser-
vices.22 In American Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,2 3 ° for example, the Commis-
sion recognized an overriding public interest sufficient to justify a
conditional grant of operations pending outcome of formal hearings. The
circuit court agreed that "[t]o require a full dress hearing for the issuance of
a temporary. . . license would be in effect to negate the power of the Com-
mission to deal with a large variety of exigent situations., 231' Thereafter the
Commission adopted a policy of granting temporary authorization, even in
cases involving no section 309(e) comparative hearing requirement.2 32
C. Rebuttable Presumption of Control
On occasion, the FCC has addressed the transfer-of-control issue as a pre-
sumption which may be defeated by evidence to the contrary.2 33 The FCC
identified several reasons for allowing the presumption of control to be re-
Pacific from directly or indirectly initiating, approving, or concerning in any substantial corpo-
rate changes to the target corporation if Pacific did in fact acquire control.
226. Id.
227. Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945). This case involved the grant of
regular as opposed to temporary operations.
228. Id. The Supreme Court held that the FCC could not grant one application for opera-
tions pending the holding of a comparative hearing on the other because the result would be to
render the subsequent hearing a nullity.
229. New South Media Corp. v. FCC, 685 F.2d 708 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
230. 191 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
231. Id. In overturning the special service grant, the court did not question the FCC's
action in issuing the original authorization. Rather, it objected to the perpetuation of the
granted for a decade thereafter.
232. See Peoples Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 209 F.2d 286 (1953). The standards
for granting special temporary authority were reviewed in Community Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 274 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1960). The district court distinguished the FCC's § 73.3542 and
§ 73.3594 noting that the former rule does not require the Commission undergo a thorough
factfinding procedure.
233. Id. Compare Western Gateway Broadcasting Corp., 16 F.C.C. 274, 288-89 (1951),
with Jefferson Radio Co., 35 F.C.C. 331 (1963). The FCC noted a rebuttable presumption that
there was no exact formula for ascertaining when control had transferred. 16 F.C.C. at 288-
[Vol. 35:761
Broadcast Licensees
butted in Charles W. Jobbins. 234 In that case, the acquiror, Hughes Tool
Corporation (HTC) submitted a hostile bid for control of forty-three percent
of American Broadcasting Company's outstanding voting shares. The pro-
posed tender offer expressly stated that it was not conditioned upon prior
FCC consent. Thus, by launching the takeover attempt, HTC risked violat-
ing section 310(d).
The FCC granted its consent to HTC's tender offer of ABC's shares be-
cause circumstances surrounding the takeover proposal rebutted the pre-
sumption of unlawful transfer of control. The Commission identified the
following factors as evidence that the presumption was defeated: (1) the ac-
quiror specifically recognized the FCC's jurisdiction over the matter; (2) it
attempted to cooperate with the Commission; (3) it indicated that it would
refrain from voting the stock during the pendency of any hearing to deter-
mine the legality of the transaction; and (4) the tender offer stated that HTC
undertook any risks of divestiture if FCC approval was not obtained.235 On
this basis the Commission reasoned the HTC's hostile takeover attempt did
not contravene section 310(d).23 6
In Coaxial Communications, Inc. v. FCC,237 the record showed that the
acquiror, CNA Financial Corporation, inadvertently failed to file a timely
request for consent to transfer of control. 23 ' Failure to comply with section
310(d) requirements occurred by virtue of CNA's conversion rights whereby
it increased its holdings in Coaxial Communications to fifty-one percent.
The facts surrounding the acquisition indicated that CNA's failure to file
under section 310(d) was truly inadvertent. There was also evidence that
CNA made a good faith effort to bring the matter to the FCC's attention.
Consequently, the FCC allowed CNA to rebut the presumption of unlawful
transfer of control.
VI. CONCLUSION
Oliver Wendell Holmes once wrote: "It cannot be helped, it is as it should
234. In re Application of Charles W. Jobbins, 14 F.C.C.2d 1052 (1968). For a detailed
discussion of the facts leading to this proceeding, see Charles W. Jobbins, 8 F.C.C.2d 206
(1967).
235. 14 F.C.C.2d at 1056.
236. The FCC also indicated that the mere risk of violating the statute did not reflect
adversely on Jobbins qualifications as a licensee; rather, the Commission required a showing of
willful and deliberate disregard of the statute. Id.
237. 58 F.C.C.2d 607 (1976).
238. Id. The need for FCC approval was occasioned by the conversion of nonvoting secur-
ities by CNA Financial Corporation whereby CNA increased its holdings in Coaxial voting
stock.
1986]
Catholic University Law Review
be, that the law is behind the times."'2 39 Aside from the benefits of stability
this statement connotes, it also suggests the never ending need for law
reform.
The Commission is presented with the challenge of adopting a more flexi-
ble approach to transfer-of-control applications involving hostile takeovers
of licensee broadcast stations. Given the broad discretion conferred upon it
by statute, the FCC should endeavor to promote the development of broad-
casting by recognizing the business context in which modem station licen-
sees operate. In adopting a neutral regulatory stance, the Commission does
not lessen its administrative role; nor does it diminish the FCC's policy of
broadcast regulation. The experience of other agencies has shown that there
are several alternatives for structuring an acquisition so as to comply with
regulatory procedures. There are obviously broad public policy reasons for
treating transfer of control applicants in a manner which comports with that
of other administrative agencies. The Commission should therefore strive to
foster a system of regulation that works within rather than against the forces
of market competition.
Chairman Fowler identified the challenge before his colleagues at the
Commission as follows:
If our procedures would in and of themselves discourage someone
from even beginning to make an attempt to take over a publicly
held corporation because of bad management, or where they think
they can do a better job, and they make their case to the share-
holder, I personally don't think we should be a part of a process
that is designed to artificially discourage that. We should not erect
unnecessary regulatory hoops that an entity might have to jump
through in order to effect a grant of the application. 4 °
Hostile quests for control of broadcast licensees are rarely fought on ideo-
logical bases. Rather, the regulatory hurdles drafted into the Communica-
tions Act are deftly manipulated by opposing parties in struggles for
corporate control. The Commission is beginning to acknowledge the detri-
mental implications this has for its regulatory processes. In the wake of
Storer and Multimedia, particularly, the FCC is attempting to interpret the
language of section 310(d) in terms of the business world. But this is only
part of any solution to the problems posed by hostile takeovers. The Com-
mission's challenge ahead must be to devise procedures which protect the
public's right to comment and the FCC's statutory review of the proposed
acquisition, while preventing the Commission's procedures from becoming a
239. O.W. HOLMES, Law and the Courts, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 294 (1920).
240. See Appropriations Committee Hearings, supra note 1, at 732 (statement of Mark S.
Fowler, Chairman, FCC).
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mechanism for thwarting an otherwise legitimate struggle for corporate
control.
Those sympathetic to the target company undoubtedly argue that al-
lowing an acquiror to proceed with its tender offer or proxy contest necessar-
ily prejudges the merits of any transaction. The Commission must reject this
argument, however, as it still may grant temporary authorization or a waiver
of its rules. The FCC must also recognize that voting trusts may effectively
insulate shareholders from an acquiror's exercise of control. In any event,
the Commission must be cognizant of the value of allowing the marketplace
to determine the success or failure of a proposed acquisition and the equity
of permitting an acquiror to close on its tender offer or proxy contest within
a commercially reasonable period of time.

